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PROTECTING THE "LOOK AND FEEL" OF
COMPUTER SOFTWARE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND AUSTRALIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer software poses a vexatious issue in Intellectual Prop-
erty law. Copyright clearly affords some protection to computer
programs in Australia and the United States, but the question is:
How far does the protection extend?
The issue of "look and feel" protection arises from the special
nature of computers and the computer industry. Certain manufac-
turers create computer programs which become "industry stan-
dards." These programs lead the market by long margins over their
competitors. To remain in business, some smaller manufacturers
will replicate the industry standard program. They do not actually
copy the code which is protected by copyright,1 but they copy the
"look" and the "feel" of the program. In other words, they repli-
cate the exact look of the visual display created by the program, and
the exact way the program operates. They do not copy the actual
instructions which make up the program; only the way it appears
and works.
In the United States two streams of computer copyright cases
have developed. Although seemingly separate, they have recently
combined to form the basis for "look and feel" litigation. The first
stream of cases decided the extent of copyright protection for com-
puter software as a literary work. This stream will be labelled the
"literary work stream." The second stream of cases examined
copyright protection in the computer program's audiovisual dis-
play. This will be labelled, unsurprisingly, the "audiovisual work
stream."
Over time, developing case law in the literary work stream
raised three questions. The Courts answered the first two questions
affirmatively. They asked:
1. Does copyright subsist in an application program?2
2. Does copyright protect operating system programs? 3
1. B. GAZE, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS (1989); A.
LATMAN & R. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 110-13 (1981); A.L. CLAPES,
SOFTWARE, COPYRIGHT & COMPETITION (1989); M.B. NIMMER & D. NiMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[C] (1989); GUIDE TO COMPUTER LAW 1100-1210 (CCH 1989).
2. Synercom Technology v. University Computer Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 199
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
3. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
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The third question asked:
3. Does the 1976 Copyright Act protect the structure, se-
quence and underlying organization of the computer program?
This important question embodies the unanswered issue in the
"look and feel" arena.4 The landmark case of Whelan v. Jaslow,5
seemed to protect the structure, sequence and organization of a
computer program. However, the courts remain divided on this
question. This article will analyze this division and the reasons why
it persists.6
The cases in the audiovisual work stream decided two
questions:
1. Does copyright protect the displays in computerized
video-games?7
2. Does copyright protect the computer displays of pro-
grams which are not video-games?
At first blush, the second question does not appear very com-
plicated. No real distinction exists between video displays and com-
puter displays. No real distinction exists between video displays
and computer displays because both are simply television screens
controlled by a computer chip. The emergence of the "look and
feel" issue complicated what was, in the author's opinion, standard
audiovisual copyright. Copyright in the "look and feel" of a com-
puter program should not exist. Rather, audiovisual copyright
comfortably covers the "look" of the program, and the "feel" need
not be protected. Some cases adopted this distinction,' while an-
other case confused the copyright in the audiovisual display of a
program with the separate copyright in the literary work.9 Subse-
quent courts compounded this confusion by creating a new element
dismissed, 464 U.S. 103 (1984); Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D.
Cal. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
4. Both questions 1 and 2 are settled law and are not discussed here. For a discussion
of the cases deciding these questions, see generally B. GAZE, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF
COMPUTER PROGRAM (1989); A. LATMAN & R. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES
110-132 (1981); A.L. CLAPES, SOFTWARE, COPYRIGHT & COMPETITION (1989); M.B. NIM-
MER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[C](1989); GUIDE TO COMPUTER LAW
Il1OOq11210 (CCH 1989).
5. Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156
(E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
6. See infra pp. 108-17, The Literary Work Stream.
7. The cases which decided this question are examined infra pp. 117-121, The "Video
Game" Cases.
8. Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
9. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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protected by audiovisual copyright: protection of the non-literal ex-
pression of the display screen sequence.10
Chapter 2 examines both streams and their different
formulations. 1
The third chapter examines Australian law relevant to "look
and feel" protection. In Australia no case has directly examined
this issue. Thus, the third chapter analyzes copyright and other av-
enues of litigation potentially available to plaintiffs. These avenues
include copyright, passing off, unfair competition and actions under
Part V of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.).
The fourth chapter draws conclusions about the way copyright
has been used in the United States, and how far "look and feel"
protection extends. The chapter also examines whether copyright
or another form of protection will be or should be adopted in Aus-
tralia to protect the "look and feel" of computer software.
II. "LOOK AND FEEL" IN THE UNITED STATES
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section ex-
amines important introductory concepts of United States copyright
law. 2 The second analyzes both the emergence and current status
of "look and feel" copyright protection.
A. Introduction to US. Copyright
The Copyright Act of 197613 protects an article if copyright
subsists in it. 4 Computer programs can earn copyright protection
as literary works'5 and the screen displays created by the programs
10. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986);
Manufacturer Technologies v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989); Johnson Con-
trols v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback
Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
11. See infra pp. 121-37, The "Look and Feel" Cases.
12. This article is not a treatise on Copyright Law. See generally, M. NIMMER & D.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1987); A. LATMAN & R. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR
THE EIGHTIS (1981); B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (1967); W.F.
PATRY, LATMAN's THE COPYRIGHT LAW, (6th ed. 1986).
13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1976).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1976).
15. See, e.g., Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 156 (E.D. Pa. 1985); SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 916 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113 (3d Cir. 1983); Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725
F.2d 521, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 762 (9th Cir. 1984); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.
Supp. 741, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 42 (N.D. II. 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic Int'l, 704
F.2d 1009, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 791 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 823, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 480 (1983). Note that the Supreme Court has not yet decided cases in this area.
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can be copyrighted as audiovisual works.16
1. Infringement
Section 50 1(a) contains the elements of infringement. It pro-
vides that "anyone who violates the rights of the copyright owner"
infringes copyright. Plaintiffs prove infringement either through ev-
idence of actual copying, or by proof of access to the plaintiff's
work and substantial similarity between the plaintiff and the defend-
ant's works.1 7
Two different approaches to the test of infringement have
arisen. Both approaches first ask whether the defendant had access
to the plaintiff's work. This establishes a presumption that the de-
fendant used the plaintiff's work in the creation of its work. This
presumption is upheld with a finding of substantial similarity.
The two approaches part company on the question of what
amounts to substantial similarity. The Second Circuit in Arnstein v.
Porter"8 developed the first approach. This court required the dis-
section of similarities from the viewpoint of the ordinary person.
The Ninth Circuit case of Sid & Marty Krofft Television Produc-
tions, Inc. v. McDonalds Corp., 9 looked first at similarity of ideas
and then at the similarity of expression. The next section details
these different approaches.
a The Different Circuit Court Tests
Arnstein stated that in examining the defendant's work for sim-
ilarities, the court should look to expert testimony and analytical
dissection of the works.2" Upon finding similarities, the court then
asks whether an "ordinary observer" would find the similarities so
marked that the copying becomes illegal. Courts do not admit ex-
pert testimony in applying this "ordinary observer" test.
Krofft21 created a different approach. The court divided the
steps more explicitly. After proving access as required by the Sec-
However, since Congressional pronouncements concur with the Circuit Court decisions, the
Supreme Court is likely to limit only the more extreme judgments in the lower courts (see
infra note 18).
16. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic Int'l, 704 F.2d 1009, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 791 (7th
Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 823, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 480 (1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 42 (N.D. Il. 1983); see generally, infra pp.
117-21, The Audiovisual Work Stream.
17. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
18. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
19. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
20. 154 F.2d at 468.
21. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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ond Circuit, the Ninth Circuit then applied an "extrinsic test," fol-
lowed by an "intrinsic test."22 The "extrinsic test" addresses the
question of substantial similarity of ideas between the allegedly in-
fringed and infringing work. This extrinsic test entails an objective
dissection of the work with all similarities and differences noted by
the court. In applying the extrinsic test the court may admit expert
testimony.
In examining the ideas behind the works the court looks for
more than similarity; the similarity must be substantial.23 After
hearing the expert testimony, the judge decides if the idea is sub-
stantially similar as a question of fact. If the judge finds against the
plaintiff on this test, then the action fails. However, in the "look
and feel" arena, this will almost never happen. The offending copy
will always be substantially similar in idea, since it's whole purpose
seeks to imitate the user interface of the program.
However, a favorable finding for the plaintiff on this test is not
dispositive, since the extrinsic test examines only the similarity of
ideas, not the copyrightable similarity of expression.
The "intrinsic test" follows a finding for the plaintiff on the
extrinsic test. The court examines the similarity of the plaintiff's
and defendant's expression of the ideas. The plaintiff must prevail
on this issue because copyright only protects the expression of an
idea.24
The intrinsic test requires substantial similarity of expression.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Krofft,25 like the Second
Circuit in Arnstein,26 stated that in examining similarity of expres-
sion the court must look at the works from the viewpoint of the
"ordinary reasonable observer. '"27 This adopts the earlier decision
of Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.2" In Roth the court
stated that: "[T]he test of infringement is whether the work is rec-
ognizable by an ordinary observer as having been taken from the
22. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1977).
23. Shakespeare's play "Romeo and Juliet" and the musical "West Side Story" provide
good examples. The ideas behind each work are substantially similar: both deal with lovers
from warring groups, internecine battles, and the eventual death of the main characters.
24. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
25. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
26. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
27. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
28. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). Roth in
turn adopted White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1907).
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copyrighted source." "
The court applies this ordinary observer test without reference
to the earlier dissection or expert testimony.30 Thus, both the
Krofft and Roth courts advocated a "gestalt"31 approach in using
the intrinsic test by looking at the works with the somewhat untu-
tored and uncritical eye of the ordinary observer.
The Roth court emphasized the "gestalt" approach by intro-
ducing a term which embodies this methodology. The court said
that in deciding the intrinsic test in that case, "It appears to us in
total concept and feel the cards of Universal are the same as the
copyrighted cards of Roth."32
b. The Preferred Approach
The difficulty is, which of the two tests should be applied?
Since Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal are not bound by decisions
of each other,33 thirteen tests could theoretically evolve.34 Usually
one or at most two tests will emerge as the leaders of the field. This
occurs when one Circuit decides many cases in the area and gains
acceptance by other Circuits as particularly expert in the area. Due
to the number of decisions in the computer field made by the Ninth
Circuit 5 the Roth/Krofft test will likely be followed in other
29. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)
(quoting White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1907)); Bradbury
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 287 F.2d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 1961).
30. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167
(9th Cir. 1977).
31. "A 'shape,' 'configuration,' or 'structure' which as an object of perception forms a
specific whole or unity incapable of expression simply in terms of its parts .... " OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
32. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)
(emphasis added). This term "total concept and feel" was adopted in Krofft, and though it is
impossible to say for certain, may be the origin of the term "look and feel." See A.L.
CLAPES, SOFrWARE, COPYRIGHT & COMPETrTION (1989). The terms should not be con-
fused nor used interchangeably. "Total concept and feel" is used to decide the intrinsic test.
"Look and feel" only describes the general area of litigation, and is not a term of art.
33. H.J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 148-176 (1986).
34. The First to the Eleventh Circuits, the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Fed-
eral Circuit.
35. Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., (N.D. Cal., No C-86-2051 WAI); Frybarger v.
I.B.M. Corp., 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987); Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F.
Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 562 F. Supp. 775, 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 47 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521, 221 U.S.P.Q. 762 (9th Cir. 1984);
Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computer, 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Digidyne
Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 U.S. 18 (1985),
rehlg denied, 106 S.Ct. 18 (1985); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal.
1986); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D.
Idaho 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Circuits.
However, even if this does happen, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeal in Krofft opined that no conflict existed between the Roth
and Arnstein tests. The Krofft court thought Arnstein's test was es-
sentially the same extrinsic/intrinsic two step test.3 6 With the ex-
ception of the subsidiary "total concept and feel" test, the tests are
basically identical. Any analysis of fact situations in this article will
be on the basis of the Roth/Krofft test, because it divides the issues
more clearly.
The next section of this article looks at the emergence of "look
and feel" issues.
B. The Emergence of the "'Look and Feel" Cases
As already stated,37 two streams of computer copyright cases
form the basis for "look and feel" litigation: the literary work and
audiovisual work streams.
1. The Literary Work Stream
The literary work stream of cases examined the protected ele-
ments of the computer program.
Computer programs fit Judge Learned Hand's level of abstrac-
tions test38 remarkably well. They display the necessary continuum
of elements of ideas and expression. The concept of the program
forms the highest level of ideas. An example of this is the unpro-
tected idea of the program as a "word processor" or "spreadsheet"
program. At the other end of the continuum, the individual in-
structions demonstrate the most concrete expression of the idea and
are clearly protectable.39 What then, of the elements in between?
Nowadays software is usually written by a method called
"structured programming."'' At the most abstract or "idea" level,
the programmer decides or is told what the program should do.
Next the programmer creates a pattern of functions. The functions
36. "We believe that the court in Arnstein was alluding to the idea-expression dichot-
omy which we make explicit today." 562 F.2d at 1165.
37. See supra pp. 102-05, Introduction.
38. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
39. See generally B. GAZE, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
(1989); A. LATMAN & R. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES (1981); A.L. CLAPES,
SOFTWARE, COPYRIGHT & COMPETITION (1989); M.B. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT (1989); GUIDE TO COMPUTER LAW (CCH 1989).
40. See generally H.L. CAPRON, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND DESIGN (The Benjamin/
Cummings Publishing Company 1986); D.R. JEFFERY & M.J. LAWRENCE, SYSTEMS ANAL-
YSIS AND DESIGN (Prentice-Hall of Australia 1984); H. KATzAN, JR., INTRODUCTION TO
COMPUTER SCIENCE 54-77 (1975).
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make up isolated modules to which the programmer assigns certain
tasks and between which the programmer designates certain meth-
ods of interaction. The grouping, interaction and naming of mod-
ules, inter alia, provide the program's structure. Finally, the
programmer individually codes each module; placing the instruc-
tions in such an order that the module performs the assigned task.
This vastly simplified picture presents a continuum that Learned
Hand envisaged. At one end of the continuum, the specification of
the whole program's operation must constitute the unprotectable
idea. At the other end of the continuum, the instructions represent
clear expression.
Plaintiffs in the cases described below, asked the courts
whether the structure, the function names, the function interaction,
and the grouping of modules warranted copyright protection.
a. Synercom v. University
The earliest federal court decision on computer software was,
interestingly enough,4 concerned with the copyrightability of the
program structure. In Synercom Technology v. University Computer
Co.,42 the court decided the complicated issue of protectability of
program structure. The court found that structure was not pro-
tected, because of a fear of creating wide-reaching monopolies.
How the court arrived at their decision, which in the author's opin-
ion is incorrect, bears closer analysis.
The plaintiff, Synercom, modified an existing non-copyrighted
program designed to solve structural engineering problems.
Synercom changed the format of the input and instructional manu-
als, to make the program easier to use. The company then regis-
tered copyright in the program and manuals. Two ex-employees of
Synercom formed EDI, one of the defendant companies. They in-
dependently created their own structural analysis program. Due to
Synercom's market dominance, the defendants believed the success
of their program required Synercom's input format. With the same
input format, EDI's program could readily use large stacks of data
cards created by Synercom's engineers. EDI's compatibility with
Synercom's program saved them considerable time and money, al-
lowing them to undersell Synercom and hopefully woo away their
customers.
41. "Interestingly enough" because the more obvious and simpler question asks the
"iterative analysis" question of what percentage of a plaintiff's instructions have been cooied?
42. Synercom Technology v. University Computer Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 199
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
1991]
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Synercom sued for copyright infringement allegedly present in
the input format, as an adjunct to copyright in the computer pro-
gram. The Federal Court of the Northern District of Texas ex-
amined the idea/expression dichotomy in relation to the plaintiff's
input formats, and found that these formats represented ideas and
not expression.
The court reviewed previous "blank form" cases, which ex-
amined whether copyright protected a mere "blank form" with var-
ious fields outlined in the form. Courts since the seminal case of
Baker v. Selden43 have uniformly denied protection of a "blank
form" unless the form conveys some information in addition to sim-
ply storing information.' Likewise, since the Synercom court
found that the input formats provided no information, it denied
copyright protection. 5
Since the current batch of "look and feel" cases deal with the
copyrightabiity of the user interface' this case is significant. That
an, albeit trivial, user interface in Synercom was unprotected sug-
gests that courts will subsequently deny protection for the user in-
terface or user input format. District Judge Higginbotham in
Synercom strengthened this analysis by analogizing the input for-
mat to the H-pattern gearshift in manual cars. His Honour said
that to allow the first manufacturer of this H-pattern shift copyright
protection would confer a dangerous and wide-reaching monopoly.
Similar to a consistent Macintosh-like interface for all computers,
the use of such a gearshift "might be socially desirable; as it would
reduce the retraining of drivers."'47
This argument is not new. Copyright law has always required
a balance of two competing public policies. The first policy favors
the dissemination of knowledge created through intellectual effort.
The incentive of a limited economic monopoly on the product of the
effort48 encourages this intellectual effort. The opposing public pol-
icy limits economic monopolies which extend beyond the public
good and prohibits using these monopolies for wide-ranging com-
43. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
44. See, e.g., Harcourt, Brace & World v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517,
171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 219 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
45. 462 F. Supp. at 1011-12.
46. See infra pp. 121-37, The "Look and Feel" Cases.
47. 462 F. Supp. at 1013.
48. As shown by the existence of all statutes protecting intellectual property, e.g. in
Australia: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth); Designs Act 1906 (Cth); Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth);
Patents Act 1952 (Cth); and in the United States Copyright Act 1976, Title 17, U.S.C.; Pat-
ents Act 1952, Title 35, U.S.C.; Lanham Act, Title 15, U.S.C.
[Vol. 7
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mercial control of markets.49
In refusing protection for fear of creating a monopoly, Judge
Higginbotham ignores a fundamental aspect of monopolies. The
market in which the monopoly operates determines whether the
monopoly becomes "dangerous and wide-reaching." Important dif-
ferences exist between the market for gearsticks and the market for
user interfaces making Judge Higginbotham's argument against
protection fail upon closer inspection for three reasons.
First, there are only a finite number of possible gearstick pat,
terns. Granting a monopoly on H-pattern gearsticks creates a dan-
ger because manufacturers could then copyright all unique
gearstick patterns. Eventually, with all possible gearstick patterns
copyrighted, manufacturers could charge exorbitant royalties for
use of their pattern. In contrast, an almost infinite variety of input
formats exist and are available to creators of programs. There is no
danger of running out of input formats.
Secondly, designing the H-pattern shift requires such minimal
intellectual effort that it will doubtlessly fail to earn the protection
of copyright. Compare this with the extensive work required to cre-
ate a coherent and efficient user interface or input format,5" and the
analogy between gearsticks and input formats begins to wear a little
thin.
Finally, copyright does not actually grant a monopoly. Unlike
patents, copyright only protects the creator's work from copying. If
another person independently creates the same input format or user
interface then they can claim copyright protection, and the first cre,
ator has absolutely no recourse.
So, with respect, Judge Higginbotham erred in saying that
copyright in the input format creates a dangerous monopoly."1
49. Hence the existence of antitrust legislation in the United States and Australia, e.g.
in the U.S.: Sherman Antitrust Act, Title 15, U.S.C., chap. 1; Clayton Act, Title 15, U.S.C.,
chap. 1; and in Australia: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
50. See Dailey, Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corpo-
ration, The Look and Feel of Copyrightable Expression, 8 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 234
(1987).
51. There followed a sequence of cases which discussed the issue of copyright of com-
puter software on a purely "iterative" level. See Data Cash Sys. v. J.S. & A. Group, 480 F.
Supp. 1063, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 735 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038
(7th Cir. 1980); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal.
1981); Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
113 (3d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983); Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 562 F. Supp. 774,
218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 47 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 762 (9th
Cir. 1984). The issue was whether the direct copying of instructions by a competitor was
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b. SAS, Johnson and Q-Co
Three cases followed which at first glance seemed to deal with
a separate issue: Can the program translation from one computer
language or one machine to another language or machine infringe
the copyright in the original program? The cases were SAS Institute
v. S & H Computer Systems, 2 Inc., E. Johnson Co. v. Uniden
Corp.53 and Q-Co Industries v. Hoffman.54 In deciding the above
question, the courts looked at the protectability of the structure of
the program. Essentially, the courts said that the translation could
infringe copyright, provided both programs demonstrated substan-
tial similarity. 55 The SAS court found substantial similarity in near-
literal copying, an identical redundant subroutine and, more impor-
tantly for this discussion, structural copying. In Uniden numerous
instances of identical copying, repetition of redundant pieces of
code and similarities in the algorithm ("Barker Code" sequence)
demonstrated substantial similarity. 56 Both cases assumed that
structural copying constituted an infringement,57 placing them fun-
damentally at odds with Synercom.
Q-Co's decision appears to follow Synercom. Q-Co held that
structure was not protectable expression. However the court's rea-
soning is confused and one can read it a number of ways.
The copyrighted program at issue was a "teleprompter"; it dis-
played text on a television screen and prompted television news-
readers. The allegedly infringing copy was written in a different
language making direct copying impossible. However the program-
mer for the defendants admitted using the plaintiff's concept and
structure.
actionable in copyright. Also discussed at the time was the application of copyright to source
and object code, as well as the method of fixation of subject matter such as on microchip or
floppy disk. This is beyond the scope of this paper and will not be discussed further. (For
discussion on this and other issues not covered here, see GAZE, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF
COMPUTER PROGRAMS (1989); A. LATMAN & R. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES
(1981); A.L. CLAPES, SOFrWARE, COPYRIGHT & COMPETITION (1989); M.B. NIMMER & D.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1989); GUIDE TO COMPUTER LAW, (CCH 1989).
52. SAS Inst. v. S&H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 916
(M.D. Tenn. 1985); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1492-1496,
228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 891 (D. Minn. 1985), Q-Co. Indus. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 615,
228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
53. 605 F. Supp. 816, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 916 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
54. 623 F. Supp. 1485, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 891 (D. Minn. 1985).
55. 625 F. Supp. 608, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
56. 623 F. Supp. at 1492-98.
57. 605 F. Supp. at 830; 623 F. Supp. at 1494 (use of identical sampling rate, use of
sampling error table); 623 F. Supp. at 1495 (use of H-matrix); 623 F. Supp. at 1496 (copying
of 38 of 44 subroutines).
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Even so, the court denied protection. They reasoned that the:
"order and organization [of the program modules] can be more
closely analogized to the concept of wheels for the car rather than
the intricacies of a particular suspension system."58
This decision placed the structure of the program at the same
level of abstraction as ideas, rendering it unprotectable. Oddly, this
statement clashes with an earlier statement that the allegedly copied
program would not escape infringement if similarity were shown in
substantial elements "including structure and arrangement."59
Furthermore, the court referred to a previous non-computer
case where book structure constituted protectable expression. In
Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers,' the "topics to be in-
cluded, [and] weighting of topics and sequencing of topics"61 com-
prised copyrightable expression. Thus, the court held that the
defendants' adoption of the book's structure, content, and sequence
infringed upon the plaintiff's copyright.62
Q-Co referred to Meredith, but distinguished it because in the
case at bar the structure amounted to indispensable expression.6"
The court then adopted the stance that structure in computer pro-
grams is protectable expression unless it falls within one of the stan-
dard exceptions, such as indispensable expression. Thus, although
the court's reasoning appears confused, it's rationale falls in line
with SAS and Uniden because it recognizes copyright protection for
computer programs.
c. Whelan v. Jaslow
The major case of Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Labora-
tory 4 enhanced the majority view granting copyright protection to
a program's structure. Whelan decided categorically that structure
58. 625 F. Supp. at 616.
59. Id. at 615.
60. 378 F. Supp. 686 ($.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974), opinion after
trial, 413 F. Supp. 385 (5.D.N.Y. 1975).
61. 378 F. Supp. at 687.
62. The case concerned the plaintiff's book entitled "Child Development and Personal-
ity." The book, by three eminent specialists, was the standard college text and of considera-
ble value. The defendant publishers took the plaintiff's book as a model and extracted the
ideas in each topic and had them written out by freelance writers. The level of correspon-
dence even down to the content of individual sentences and paragraphs was, according to the
court, quite remarkable.
63. That is to say, elements necessarily dictated by the idea itself, not imaginatively
created by the copyright holder. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d
738 (9th Cir. 1971).
64. 609 F. Supp. 1307, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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was a proper subject matter for copyright. This proposition has
been widely criticised,65 but seems to have attracted criticism for
stating explicitly what had already implicitly become accepted. The
cases of Uniden, Q-Co, Meredith and SAS all point in the direction
Whelan eventually took. So, Whelan does not stand in petulant
isolation.
This case concerned a software contractor, Elaine Whelan and
her client, Jaslow Dental Laboratory. Whelan created a program
for Jaslow Dental Laboratory which managed the accounting, in-
ventory and billing for dental laboratories. Whelan retained copy-
right in the program and registered it with the Copyright Office as a
literary work. The program ran on an IBM minicomputer, and Jas-
low seized the opportunity of translating the program to run on the
ever-increasingly popular IBM personal computer. Jaslow sued
Whelan under state law for trade secret appropriation. Whelan re-
taliated in copyright, and removed the case to the federal court on
the trade secret and copyright issues.
Commentators have accorded Whelan landmark significance
because it adopted the approach that the structure, sequence and
organization of a computer program deserves copyright protec-
tion.66 The court decided a number of propositions on this point.
First copyright protects the general format of the file structures in a
program. This conflicts almost directly with Synercom. Secondly,
the court held it unnecessary to show complete similarity between
the two programs. Substantial similarity of overall structure, order,
sequencing or organization will suffice to constitute infringement.
d. Plains Cotton v. Goodpasture
There followed the case of Plains Cotton Co-op v. Goodpasture
Computer Service.68 This case was similar on the facts to Whelan
65. Sundholm, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs Extends Beyond Literal
Duplication to Structure Sequence, and Organization, 3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 221 (1987); Levy, Applying Copyright Laws to Computer Software Given Recent
Developments in the United States, Vol 1, No.12 INT'L COMPUTER L. ADVISER 8, 10 (Sept.
1987); Sundholm, Computer Copyright Infringement: Beyond the Limits of the Iterative Test,
3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 400 (1987).
66. See, e.g., Pinherio & Lacroix, Protecting the "look and feel" of Computer Software, I
HIGH TECH. L.J. 411, 425-427 (1987); Russo & HALE, Developments in Copyright Protection
of Computer Software, INT'L COMPUTER L. ADVISOR 1, 10 (Jan. 1988); Sundholm, Computer
Copyright Infringement: Beyond the Limits of the Iterative Test, 3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J., 397-399 (1987).
67. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1240 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
68. 807 F.2d 1256, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 813 F.2d
407 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
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because the defendants rewrote the plaintiff's existing mainframe
program, Telcot, for personal computers. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal declined to follow the Third Circuit's lead in Whelan on
the question of what it termed "organizational copying. ' 69 Instead
it followed Synercom, also decided in the Fifth circuit, holding that
the structure and sequence of a computer program constituted
ideas.7" The court distinguished Whelan for three reasons.7' Only
the last argument pertains to the question of whether copyright pro-
tects structure. This argument claimed that the evidence of similar-
ities resulted largely from "externalities in the cotton market."72
The final argument is similar to Q-Co, reasoning that structure
amounted to indispensable expression.73 The doctrine of merger is
a standard exception to protectability, whether of commonly copy-
righted elements such as program code or less commonly copy-
righted elements like program structure.74 Therefore the primary
reason the Plains Cotton court distinguished Whelan is a common
doctrine, which Whelan never questioned. The reason for distin-
guishing Whelan is therefore illogical. It is the author's submission
that subsequent courts should prefer the reasoning of Whelan over
Plains Cotton. The most recent case in the stream, Pearl Systems v.
Competition Electronics, supports this approach.
e. Pearl Systems v. Competition Electronics
Pearl Systems v. Competition Electronics75 revolved around the
plaintiff's pistol-shot timing device. The defendant marketed a very
similar device which the plaintiff alleged copied subroutines in its
device. The judge found for the plaintiff, following Whelan without
demur: "the separate subroutines in a computer program are pro-
tected by the copyright laws, See Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc.'
76
69. Id at 1262.
70. Id. In fact, the court used a confusing double negative to make this simple proposi-
tion, "[D]eclin[ing] to hold that [structure and sequence] cannot constitute 'ideas' in a com-
puter context."
71. The first two reasons don't address the question of whether structure is protected,
but relate only to the facts of Plains Cotton. These reasons were that the courts' review was
not on the merits and that Plains Cotton was a preliminary hearing.
72. 807 F.2d at 1262.
73. This is an application of the doctrine of merger. The doctrine denies copyright
protection to elements of a work which are expression but which are dictated by the underly-
ing idea. Herbet Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
74. See supra note 73.
75. 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
76. Id. at 1524. Plains Cotton was cited as contrasting authority, but was not discussed.
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f Conclusion
The above cases demonstrate the division between the courts.
Meredith, SAS, Uniden, Pearl Systems, and Whelan favour the
proposition that copyright protects structure, sequence and organi-
zation. Goodpasture rejects this, and Q-Co doesn't help either way.
Which then, is the better approach?
Despite the aforementioned flaws in Plains Cotton 77 and Q-
Co78 reasoning, it is still useful here to examine the contrasting pol-
icy considerations concerning the copyright protection of program
structure.
The expansion of the bounds of copyright in computer pro-
grams came under a great deal of scrutiny and criticism, particu-
larly after Whelan.79 Carl Sundholm addresses the three main
arguments against the adoption of Whelan, and therefore the pro-
tection of structure, sequence and organization.8" The arguments
essentially claim that:
1. Approximating an existing program takes as much ef-
fort as creation of the original.
2. Protecting the concept of the program's structure is too
vague and dangerously open to abuse, as it extends copyright be-
yond its philosophical endpoint.
3. Protecting the structure stifles the creation of innovative
new programs.
The first argument is simply not correct. Creating the struc-
ture, interaction of modules, and organization of the program forms
one of the most time-consuming and expensive components of pro-
gramming. By adopting structured programming methods,81 the
actual coding is almost trivial since the structure determines which
instructions to use and where they should be placed.
The second argument seeks to create the spectre of wide mo-
77. Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 813 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
78. Q-Co Indus. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 554 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
79. See, eg., McKay, Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.: "Look and
Feel" Copyright Protection for the Display Screens of an Application Microcomputer Program,
13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 105 (1987); Pinheiro & Lacroix, Protecting the "Look
and Feel" of Computer Software, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 411 (1987); Russo & Hale, Developments
in Copyright Protection of Computer Software, INT'L COMPUTER L. ADVISER 5 (Jan. 1988).
80. Sundholm, Computer Copyright Infringement: Beyond the Limits of the Iterative
Test, 3 SANTA CIARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 400 (1987).
81. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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nopolies and concomitant unlimited liabilities for defendants. The
argument is fallacious. Programmers must flowchart, document
and analyze the structure of every commercial program before writ-
ing any code. The structure is at least as concrete as the actual
instructions which programmers eventually place in the positions
assigned by the rigourous structure. Moreover, even without
flowcharts and other records of the structure a trained person
could easily diagram and analyze the structure of a well-coded pro-
gram from the instructions in the program. There is no logical rea-
son why the tests for substantial similarity already mentioned could
not be applied to structure as easily as to the instructions.
The third argument is a dangerous one. It assumes that a new
program must copy the structure of the existing program in order to
advance the field of computer programming. Mr. Sundholm fails to
clarify his contention. Any program which must copy a substantial
portion of an existing program can hardly be termed "innovative."
Moreover, this argument applies equally to any copyright subject
matter, not only the computer field. Yet no one would claim that
we should dilute copyright protection, in order that "innovative"
derivative works should be made at the expense of the original
author.
For these reasons, in the author's opinion, the arguments
against the protection of structure, sequence and organization re-
main unpersuasive.
2. The Audiovisual Work Stream
A spate of copyright cases began in 1981, all involving com-
puter controlled video games. 2 The cases became known as the
"video game cases." Unfortunately this appellation gives the im-
pression that the cases form one homogeneous set, deciding the
same fundamental issues. This was not so.
Most of the video game cases concerned audiovisual copy-
right.8 3 However, certain courts decided cases concerning audiovi-
82. These games are essentially a small computer. The computer displays the output on
a cathode ray tube, like a television tube. Users input information by a number of joysticks
and buttons mounted on the cabinet which house the tube, the computer chip and the input
devices. The player uses the joysticks and buttons to control certain images presented on the
screen by the computer. Other images are controlled by the computer itself.
83. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981); Atari v.
Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Atari v. Armenia Ltd., [1981-1983]
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 125,328 (E.D. IlL. Nov. 3, 1981); Atari v. Williams Elec., 217
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 746 (E.D. Cal. 1981); Atari v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp.,
672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic
Int'l, 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
1991]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4W JOURNAL
sual copyright on the basis of literary work copyright.84 This
section will not discuss the video game cases decided on "literary
work" principles.8 5 It will focus on the audiovisual cases, which laid
the foundations for "look and feel" copyright.
a. Atari v. Williams
The first three cases on video game audiovisual copyright con-
cerned only direct copies.8 6 The fourth, Atari, Inc. v. Williams
lectronic, 7 addressed a more interesting issue because the defend-
ant modified the plaintiff's game. The plaintiff's game, Pac-Man,
featured a character chased around a maze by ghost characters.
The defendant's game, although similar, differed from Pac-Man in
&rtain important respects. This game, Jawbreakers, had a different
khape and form, additional features, and different accompanying
music and colours. The court made a comprehensive list of the sim-
ilarities and differences, and decided no substantial similarity ex-
isted. Though the idea of the maze chase game originated from
Pac-Man, of course copyright did not protect the idea. Moreover,
the ordinary observer would not have noticed the similarities in the
expression of the games. Thus, the court declined to hold
infringement.
b. Atari v. North American
The next case Atari, Inc. v. North American Phillips Consumer
Electronics Group,8 again concerned Pac-Man imitators. The Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted Krofft. It stated that the
defendant's game, K. C. Munchkin captured the "total concept and
feel"8 9 of Pac-Man. In applying the "total concept and feel" test,
U.S. 824 (1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-Am., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982); Williams
Elec. v. Artie Int'l, 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Nintendo of Am. v. Bay Coin Distrib.,
11981-1983] Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1125,409 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Stem Elec. v. Kaufman, 669
V.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 228 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 705 (4th Cir. 1986); Data East USA v. Epyx, 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988); Frybarger
v. IBM Corp., 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987).
84. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic Int'l, 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd 704
F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983) cert denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564
F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Williams Elec. v. Arctic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
85. These cases are not relevant to a discussion of "look and feel" copyright. See supra
note 28.
86. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981); Atari v.
Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Atari v. Armania, Ltd., [1981-1983]
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1125,328 (E.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 1981).
87. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 746 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
88. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
89. Id. at 619-20.
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the court looked to the effect it would have on the ordinary ob-
server, and found for Atari
c. Midway v. Bandai
Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Bandai-Am. ° followed Krofft's
bifurcated extrinsic/intrinsic test without modification. In this unu-
sual case, the defendant copied the plaintiff's full sized original into
a less sophisticated, handheld video game. In applying the extrinsic
part of the test the court found that the idea was copied, based on
the expert evidence and the numerous similarities. In applying the
intrinsic test, the court held that though certain features were differ-
ent, the ordinary observer looking only at the gross features91 would
find substantial similarity. The court also rejected the defendant's
contention that they had merely copied the idea, and that the ele-
ments constituted indispensable expression. To uphold such a con-
tention would assume the idea included the detailed elements or
expression and "[i]f such a reasoning were accepted, a copyright
defendant could always avoid liability merely by describing a plain-
tiff's work in great detail and labeling [sic] that as a description of
the 'idea' of the plaintiff's work."9" Such a ploy would not be toler-
ated by the courts.
d. Stern v. Kaufman
The next case, Stern Electronics Inc. v. Kaufman,93 adum-
brated several important questions which have since become funda-
mental to the "look and feel" debate:
1. Whether an audiovisual work is original when
the code of the uncopyrighted computer program deter-
mines its features?
2. Does a change in the order of presentation of the
copyrighted audiovisual elements caused by the user's in-
teraction invalidate the copyright?
3. Is a defendant program's identical display an in-
fringement of the plaintiff's copyrighted display even
where the defendant has a different program code?
Omni, a co-defendant, sold games which were for all intents
and purposes identical to Stem's copyrighted game called Scramble.
90. 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982).
91. lId at 138 (quoting Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salked, 511 F.2d 904, 908-09 (3d
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975)).
92. Id. at 148.
93. Stem Elec. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Stem had registered audiovisual, but not literary work copyright,
because numerous computer programs can generate the identical
display. For example if only the literary work were protected, then
program B could precisely copy program A's display and not in-
fringe A if B's code was different. As the court said, exactly the
same display could be generated by an almost infinite number of
different computer programs. 94
The defendants raised two arguments. First, they claimed no
originality existed in the audiovisual work, thereby precluding
copyright protection. They argued that the previously created, un-
copyrighted computer program determined the features of the dis-
play. The court gave this argument short shrift. It stated simply
that courts may sever the literary work and audiovisual copyrights
without affecting the other, provided an element of originality exists
in each. Since the audiovisual copyright elements in Scramble
stemmed from the plaintiff, Stem satisfied this originality
requirement.
Secondly, the defendants argued that users created new works
each time they played the game, because users' actions resulted in
slightly different sequences of images shown on the screen. The
court rejected this by reasoning that the same copyrighted sights
and sounds were repeated, albeit in slightly different
arrangements. 95
This case decided important issues which have arisen in the
recent crop of "look and feel" litigation.96 The question of whether
copyright protects an identical display even when it has a different
program code is fundamental to "clone" manufacturers. Stern de-
cided that in this fact situation infringement existed. For example,
audiovisual registration would sufficiently protect the look of the
Apple Macintosh user interface or Lotus 1-2-3 interface. With iden-
tical audiovisual displays, Stern's reasoning would apply and hold
the defendant liable even if the clone had a different underlying
code.
Stern also held that even if a computer user changes the dis-
play, it will not invalidate the copyright. The change in the dis-
play's order of the copyrighted audiovisual elements is immaterial,
if there is a repetition of the separate copyrighted elements.97
94. Id. at 855.
95. Id. at 856.
96. See infra pp. 121-37, The '"Look and Feel" Cases.
97. Stern Elec. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982).
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e. Kramer v. Andrews
After a three year lull, the final audiovisual video game case
appeared. This case, Kramer Manufacturing Co. v. Andrews,98 dealt
with a video poker game called Hi-Lo Double Up Joker Poker. In
examining audiovisual copyright, the court applied the ordinary ob-
server test. They held the defendant had infringed audiovisual
copyright, and interestingly, that the copyright in the literary work
was also infringed because of the audiovisual infringement. The
court said the" 'memory device' or computer program qualifies as a
copy of plaintiff's audiovisual work and as such is protected under
the plaintiff's (audiovisual] copyright."99
The effect of this statement may well extend beyond the court's
expectations. For if a substantially similar work in visual terms in-
fringes a program's audiovisual copyright even though it has a dif-
ferent code, then on this court's formulation the non-similar coding
infringes the plaintiff's copyright in the literary work. This is a
dangerous concept. It remains to be seen whether this anomaly is
ever applied to the extent postulated.
3. The "Look and Feel" Cases
The literary work stream and the audiovisual work stream
seemed to be heading in entirely different directions. The literary
work stream focused on the structure of the computer program.
The audiovisual work stream addressed only the appearance of the
computer program. However, in any field as narrow as computer
software copyright, the streams inevitably intersected. Broderbund
Software v. Unison World 1o represents this intersection. This court
applied the literary stream cases of Synercom '0 1 and Whelan o2 to
audiovisual copyright.
Since then, a number of "look and feel" cases emerged and
altered copyright protection of user interfaces. Some cases decided
that audiovisual copyright in the displays protects the user inter-
face. Other cases extended this and copyrighted the sequence of the
displays. This section will examine all of these cases.
98. 783 F.2d 421, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 705 (4th Cir. 1986).
99. I. at 441-42 (emphasis in original).
100. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
101. Synercom Tech. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 199 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 537 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
102. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd
797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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a. Broderbund v. Unison World
Broderbund licensed a program called Print Shop, which ran
on the Apple II computer. The program created personalized
greeting cards. Unison negotiated with Broderbund to translate
Print Shop from the Apple II format to IBM-PC format. During
negotiations, Unison proceeded to replicate the function and exact
appearance of Print Shop, with Broderbund's permission. Negotia-
tions broke down, and Unison instructed its programmers to con-
tinue development of the IBM version. They retained the work
already copied from Print Shop, and finished the program using
their own ideas for an "enhanced" version. Broderbund sued for
audiovisual copyright infringement when Unison marketed its fin-
ished program, The Printmaster. 3
The court analyzed the two previous literary work cases:104
Synercom 05 and Whelan.10 6 This seems strange since the plaintiffs
claimed audiovisual copyright infringement. However, the court
held Whelan's reasoning applied to audiovisual copyright as well:
"Whelan thus stands for the proposition that copyright protection
is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer program, but
rather extends to the overall structure of a program, including its
audiovisual displays."10 7
The court decided this proposition appeared more attractive
than the opposite view taken in Synercom, for two reasons.
First, Synercom preceded Whelan, giving the Whelan court the
advantage of Synercom's reasoning. The court's rejection of
Synercom's reasoning indicates that, all other things being equal,
the Whelan court disapproved of Synercom. The Broderbund court
103. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986). The
action was also brought in textual copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and un-
fair competition under relevant state law. At trial, the court only decided the audiovisual
copyright issue.
104. Before examining these cases, the court first dealt with the problem of indispensable
expression. District Court Judge William Orrick recognized that copyright protection may
not be available if the idea and the expression have merged, but concluded that no such
merger existed in the instant case. He drew this conclusion because the plaintiffs had another
greeting card printing program called Stickybear Printer aimed at the children's market. This
program embodied the same idea of a greeting card printing program, but no merger existed
because the program's expression was very different. Id. at 1132.
105. Synercom Tech. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1127, 199 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 537 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
106. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156
(E.D. Pa. 1985), 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
107. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(emphasis added).
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felt the latter case should prevail, simply because it was the latter. 108
Secondly, opined Orrick J., "Congress intended sequencing
and ordering to be protectable in appropriate circumstances,...
and the computer field is not an exception to this general rule.""'9
Therefore the court found that Whelan "compel[led] the rejec-
tion of the defendant's argument that the overall structure, sequenc-
ing, and arrangement of the screens in "Print Shop" fall outside the
ambit of copyright protection."' 10
Having determined this, the court then found infringement be-
cause Unison had actually admitted their attempts to replicate Print
Shop."' However, "[i]n the interest of creating a comprehensive
record"1"2 the court decided the question of substantial similar-
ity."' The court applied the Krofft test." 4 It found substantial
similarity of ideas on the expert evidence given, and on the intrinsic
test found that the infringing work captured the "total concept and
feel" '115 of the original work. 116
This case created one ground-breaking principle: copyright
108. This strange reasoning leads to the inevitable conclusion that a latter case should
always be followed in preference to an earlier one. The court does not say how this proposi-
tion is affected if the latter case is wrong at law.
109. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(citing Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1241 (3d Cir. 1986)).
110. Id. at 1133-1134. The court also decided two subsidiary issues: the "utilitarian
article" doctrine and the "rules and instructions" doctrine.
The "utilitarian article" doctrine stems from the definition of a pictorial, graphic work in
17 U.S.C. § 101. It only allows for copyright protection for any separate and independent
aesthetic element of a useful article, provided utilitarian considerations do not dictate the
design and shape. The court dismissed the defendant's argument stating that it was "clear
that the structure, sequence, and layout in 'Print Shop' were dictated primarily by artistic and
aesthetic considerations, and not by utilitarian or mechanical ones." Id. at 1134.
The defendant's final argument concerned the "rules and instructions" doctrine. This
doctrine disallows copyright protection for rules and instructions of processes. The rationale
behind this concept, is that providing copyright protection for the rules and instructions is
tantamount to providing copyright protection to the idea or process, where none is otherwise
available. Unison sought to disallow copyright for the Print Shop menus on the basis that the
idea and expression had merged. Since the court had previously held that this was not the
case, this argument was of no assistance to the defendant. Id at 1134. Moreover, the court
held that the menus were protectable for another reason: the screens contained stylistic crea-
tivity above and beyond the mere expression of rules or instruction. Id.
I11. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
112. Id. at 1136.
113. The defendant had not denied access to the plaintiff's work, so the court merely
noted the issue.
114. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
115. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
116. The court finished its analysis with a rejection of the defendant's argument as to
estoppel and "unclean hands." These are beyond the scope of this paper, and are not gener-
ally relevant to "look and feel" copyright.
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protects the sequence of displays. According to the court, a se-
quence of audiovisual displays of a user interface comprises a copy-
rightable audiovisual work. 1 7 This represents the first time a court
ever enunciated such a principle. It was not the last.
b. DCA v. Softklone
The next case, Digital Communications Associates v. Soft-
klone, 1  concerned copyright infringement 1 9 of the plaintiff's pro-
gram called Crosstalk XVI. DCA's programmers spent hundreds of
man-hours designing Crosstalk's main status screen. These pro-
grammers knew that if they grouped information into packets of
five to nine pieces of data they could improve information recall. 120
They designed the status screen as "command-driven" not "menu-
driven." The user would have to remember commands which per-
formed the specified functions, because the program did not present
a menu to the user. The programmers therefore had to design the
screen within the optimal range for short-term recall. Bearing these
considerations in mind, they developed a distinctive status screen
which was easy to remember and use.
Softklone marketed their product called Mirror, a non-iterative
copy of Crosstalk. Softklone began advertising.
Mirror is the mirror image of Crosstalk XVI, the industry stan-
dard in data communications software for small business com-
puters. Mirror's design closely reflects Crosstalk XVI's menus,
commands and features. In fact, if you have used Crosstalk XVI
before, you will feel right at home with Mirror. The one thing
you will not find reflected in Mirror is Crosstalk XVI's $195.00
price. Because we control the reflection, Mirror costs only$49.95. 21
The two programs were essentially identical to the user, but
117. The court actually interpreted Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1986), a literary work case, as authority that audiovisual display sequences were
copyright. There was no mention of whether this was copyright as an audiovisual work or
literary work. Presumably the court meant that audiovisual sequences were copyrightable as
audiovisual works, not literary works. The alternative is too far-fetched.
118. 659 F. Supp. 449, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
119. Originally the action was for copyright infringement, federal and common law un-
fair competition and violation of common law right of publicity, with counter claims by the
defendant of common law unfair competition and violation of federal anti-trust law. All but
the copyright action were deferred by agreement between the parties.
120. Transcript of Proceedings at 9, Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Dis-
trib. Co., 659 F. Supp. 449, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
121. Affadavit of Dana F. Blankenhorn, Exhibit A, Digital Communications Assoc. v.
Softklone Distrib. Co., 659 F. Supp. 449, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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Digital Communications Associates (DCA) could find no evidence
of iterative copying of code. DCA sued anyway, and alleged copy-
right infringement in the status screen and in the program as a liter-
ary work.
Copyright in the Status Screen
The defendant first argued the idea/expression dichotomy. It
claimed:
1. The status screen was an indispensable expression of the
idea underlying the screen; or
2. The status screen was merely a "blank form" and hence
unprotectable. 122
The court dismissed the first argument. It held that the ideas
behind the computer software were such things as the screen reflect-
ing the status of the program and the nature of a command driven
program, inter alia. The arrangement of the screen was "unrelated
to how the computer program operates, and [is] 'expression.' ",123
The analogy between Crosstalk's status screen and
Synercom 'S124 input formats assisted the defendant's second argu-
ment. The defendants argued the status screen was a blank form,
did not convey information and therefore unprotected. After close
examination, the court concluded that the screen, even if a form,
"clearly expresses and conveys information and, therefore, is
copyrightable." 1
25
Copyright in the Literary Work
DCA also argued that Softklone's status screen infringed the
copyright in their computer program, even though no code was
copied. The court disagreed and held that copyright protection of a
computer program does not extend to the audiovisual display, be-
cause the screen does not copy the program's literary or substantive
content.1 26 The court noted but ignored the argument made in
122. This is the same argument which was fatal in Synercom Tech. v. University Com-
puting Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
123. Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 459,
2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
124. See Synercom Tech. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 199 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 537 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
125. Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 462,
2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
126. Id. at 456.
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Kramer, apparently because it creates an "anomaly"127 which the
court was loathe to perpetuate.
c. Manufacturers Technologies v. Cams
The judge bifurcated the next case, Manufacturers Technolo-
gies v. Cams, into two separate judgments: the first128 decided the
substantive issues of liability and the second129 decided the quan-
tum of damages.
The employees of Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. (MTI),
wrote a program called COSTIMATOR. Industry used the pro-
gram to estimate the cost of machining a manufactured part. The
plaintiff registered the program and selected screen displays.1 30
The defendants Cormier and Laviana, as sales representatives
of MTI, saw versions of COSTIMATOR, and formed Cams, Inc.
Cams marketed two essentially identical cost estimating programs:
QC and RAPIDCOST. Both programs cost approximately one-
tenth to one-twentieth of plaintiff's product. MTI sued for copy-
right infringement.1 31
The Court discussed the computer copyright cases, 132 and ex-
pressed disapproval of Broderbund's reasoning. It criticized the
Broderbund court's interpretation of Whelan's reasoning. "The
Broderbund court extended the reach of Whelan by equating com-
puter program copyright protection for the structure, sequence, and
organization of a program with protection of the screen outputs,
,133
Given the Copyright Office's new practice of making one regis-
127. I; see M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986) (The argu-
ment in M. Kramer is that the audiovisual copyright actually protects the literary work).
128. Manufacturers Tech. v. Cams, 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
129. Manufacturers Tech. v. Cams, 728 F. Supp. 75 (D. Conn. 1989).
130. Program: Version 01.00, Copyright Registration No TX-1-1737-901. The manual
was also registered. (Version 01.00, Copyright Registration No TX-1-808-645])
Screens: Version 01.00, Copyright Registration No. TX-1-544-052
Version 01.01, Copyright Registration No. TX-1-544-053
Version 01.02, Copyright Registration No. TX-1-544-054
Version 01.03, Copyright Registration No. TX-1-544-055
131. MTI also claimed unfair competition pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a), and state law, Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Comm. Gen Stat. § 42-
1 l0b(a), both of which are beyond the scope of this article and are not discussed here.
132. The Court first noted that the Copyright Office had at the time changed its practice
and a single copyright registration of a computer program extended copyright protection not
only to the source and object codes of the program but also to the screen displays. Manufac-
turers Tech. v. Cams, 706 F. Supp. 984, 990-991 (D. Conn. 1989).
133. Manufacturers Tech. v. Cams, 706 F. Supp. 984, 992 (D. Conn. 1989).
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tration for both literary and audiovisual copyright,' 34 the Court ex-
amined the two alternatives: either to follow Broderbund or "treat
the single registration of the computer program as accomplishing
two interrelated yet distinct registrations: one of the program itself
and one of the screen displays or user interface."' 135 It adopted the
latter. 136
The Court then looked at the copyrightability of various ele-
ments of the plaintiff's work. It held that the elements within the
screen and the use of various keys to move within the screens were
not copyrightable: they were indispensable expression. 137  How-
ever, the court found three elements copyrightable. They were:
1. The "external sequencing"; the way the program steps
through various screens to obtain information. This was copy-
rightable for the evidence revealed that no two human cost es-
timators performed this function in the same way. This took the
sequencing out of the bounds of indispensable expression;
2. The screen for the report showing status of the cost esti-
mating job;
3. The screen which prompted the user for information
about the estimating job. This screen conveyed information itself
unlike a "blank form." 13
8
The judge, after finding copyright in these works, applied the
Arnstein v. Porter139 extrinsic/intrinsic test and found infringement.
The court determined substantial similarity existed between the se-
quence and flow of display screens in the plaintiff's and defendants'
works.
The court therefore seemed to have, what horse-racing enthusi-
asts call, an each-way bet. It disapproved of Broderbund which first
developed the principle of copyright in non-literal audiovisual ele-
ments, such as sequencing. Yet it held that sequencing was copy-
righted, and therefore the defendants had infringed copyright.
134. 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 155 (1988).
135. Id at 993.
136. The court's interchangeable use of the terms "screen display" and "user interface"
imply that it saw no difference between the two. This places user interfaces directly within
audiovisual copyright concepts.
137. Manufacturers Tech. v. Cams, 706 F. Supp. 984, 995 (D. Conn. 1989)(quoting Mor-
rissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1st Cir. 1967)).
138. Id. at 997 (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1976)); see also Synercom Tech. v.
University Computing, 462 F. Supp. 1003, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
139. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
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d. Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec
The next case, Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec 4 adds
little to the field, because it was, in the author's opinion, poorly
decided. However, this case provides a good example of the confus-
ing outcome that results from mixing the principles of Whelan and
DCA.
Brown Bag and Symantec both created software "outlining
programs," which allowed the user to construct, revise and reorgan-
ize an outline. The programs, called Grandview from Symantec and
PC-Outline from Brown Bag were actually quite different.141 Even
so, the court granted a summary judgment motion in Symantec's
favor.
The legal reasoning adopted is unusual. The Judge started
badly, stating in his opening sentence: "The Court is called upon to
decide whether the 'look and feel' of the screen displays in the de-
fendants' computer outlining program are substantially dissimilar
from the plaintiffs' copyrighted program. ....142
To use such a loose term as "look and feel" as a term of art
augurs ill for the remainder of the judgment. The Court went on:
"Copyright protection applies to the user interface, or overall struc-
ture and organization of a computer program, including its audiovi-
sual displays or screen 'look and feel.' "'43
This formulation fatally mixed the literary work copyright test
of "structure, sequence, and organization" in Whelan with the au-
diovisual work copyright principles of DCA. As if this were not
enough, the judge threw in a pinch of "look and feel" terminology
to create an unholy stew. While the author does not take issue with
the decision of the case, it is his opinion that to draw no distinction
between the abovementioned elements asks for trouble. The Court
gave no substantive reasoning for why the above elements war-
ranted copyright protection.
The court went on to dissect analytically the elements of the
plaintiff's alleged similarities in order to determine if the similarities
resulted from indispensable expression. 1" The court found that the
majority of features allegedly infringed were not protected and sum-
mary judgement was granted to the defendant because, "[n]o rea-
140. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
141. Id. at 1994-1996. The Court discussed the numerous differences at length.
142. Id at 1992.
143. Id. at 1993.
144. Id at 1995 (following Data East USA v Epyx, 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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sonable jury could find that the screens are substantially similar." '14 5
Note that the judge looked at the screens alone, and not the
sequencing of the elements. Even though the judge cited
Broderbund it did not follow Broderbund's logic, adopted by the
MTI court. The Symantec case was therefore decided on ordinary
audiovisual copyright principles.
e. Johnson Controls v. Phoenix Control
The next case was Johnson Controls v. Phoenix Control Sys-
tems. 1" Johnson Controls designed and implemented automated
process control systems. The software in issue contained a suite of
programs used to control waste water plants. John Schratz, a for-
mer Johnson Controls employee, sought to market similar software,
and formed Phoenix Control. Phoenix Control attempted to mar-
ket similar software. Johnson Controls sued for copyright infringe-
ment, inter alia. The District Court granted an injunction
prohibiting Phoenix Control from copying, distributing, preparing
derivatives of or publishing, (inter alia) the plaintiff's software. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the injunction, and
reversed.
Since this case involved only a preliminary injunction the
plaintiff needed to demonstrate a "reasonable likelihood of success
on its copyright infringement claim."14 7 The plaintiff succeeded, as
there was substantial similarity, though the Court did not examine
each element in the two programs. 4
Two interesting points arise out of the case. First, the Court
said that the bser interface is also called the "look and feel" of the
program and "is generally the design of the video screen and the
manner in which the information is presented to the user." 149 The
Court equated "look and feel" with display screens.
Secondly, the Court specifically differentiated between the two
streams of computer copyright in the United States.150 It talked of
two "non-literal components": structure, sequence and organiza-
tion, and the user interface or display screens. 51 This places the
145. Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1996
(N.D. Cal. 1989).
146. 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989).
147. Id. at 1174.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1175 n.3.
150. Id. at 1175.
151. Johnson Controls v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989).
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case in line with Broderbund and MTI's reasoning, in finding that
non-literal audiovisual elements deserve copyright protection.
f Lotus v. Paperback
The most eagerly awaited case since Whelan was Lotus Devel-
opment Corp. v. Paperback Software International.15 2 Though only
a District Court case, District Judge Keeton's decision provides an
exhaustive and instructive analysis.
The Lotus facts mimic the DCA case, except that the program
at the center of the controversy was a spreadsheet program,"5 3 1-2-
3. Paperback Software created a clone of 1-2-3, the market leader,
without copying any code.
However, the spreadsheet program created an important dis-
tinction between the DCA and the Lotus cases. The cells in a
spreadsheet merely provided places for inserting data, making them
closer in nature to the "blank form." This concept formed the es-
sence of the defendants' case in DCA. Lotus anticipated that copy-
right would protect the actual user interface as expression, since the
spreadsheet idea was neither protectable nor indeed theirs.1 54 Fur-
thermore, the command interface, unlike that in DCA, was not par-
ticularly complex.
The court first discussed general computer principles and sub-
sidiary constitutional issues. Then it looked at the defendants' ar-
gument that the user interface was a useful article and hence not
protected by copyright.1 "' The defendants advanced the "H-pat-
tern gearstick" principle 5 6 propounded in Synercom.1 17
The Court explicitly rejected this formulation and stated:
"Synercom's central proposition-that the expression of non literal
sequence and order is inseparable from the idea and accordingly is
152. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
153. A spreadsheet program allows entry of data into boxes drawn on the screen, called
cells. Cells can be linked together by use of formulae. Thus if data is changed in one cell, any
cells linked to the changed cell will be automatically recalculated. An inverted "L" sits
across the top of these cells. Above the "L" lies certain information such as the cell reference
and the command line, where the user commands are typed. Associated with the command
line there were instructions displayed for each command. These are called the "long
prompts." Spreadsheet programs are used for financial planning, accounting and the like.
154. The original spreadsheet program was called Visi Caic, and was manufactured by
Visicorp.
155. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
157. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990)
(citing Synercom Tech. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013, 199 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 537 (N.D. Tex. 1978)).
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not copyrightable-has been expressly rejected by several
courts." '158 The Court then went on to examine the copyrightability
of 1-2-3, using Learned Hand's "levels of abstraction" test. It held
that:
1. copyright did not protect the idea of the spreadsheet;159
and
2. copyright did not protect the rotated "L" forming the
top of the cell block, the use of an "attention" key to move from
cells to menu, or the numerical operation keys (+, -, /, *),
since these expressive elements merged with the idea of a spread-
sheet; 16o but
3. copyright did protect the menu structure as a whole.
This included the structure and order of the terms, the presenta-
tion of the menu on the screen, the choice of commands, and the
text in the "long prompts" of the menu.1
61
The judge then decided whether the structure, sequence and
order of the menu command system constituted a substantial part
of the plaintiff's work. Since the menu system provided the
"unique element" 62 of 1-2-3, the judge found no difficulty holding
for the plaintiff. The court easily found infringement for two rea-
sons. Not only was the defendants' copying "so 'overwhelming and
pervasive' as to preclude, as a matter of law, any assertion of in-
dependent creation, '1 63 but the defendants admitted copying.
Here the judge directly applied Whelan's "structure, sequence,
and organization" test for literary work copyright to the audiovi-
sual display copyright in the menu system. 16 This mirrors the rea-
soning of MTI and Broderbund.1 61
The Court then examined the defendant's policy arguments. It
found without exception they were inconsistent with the Copyright
Act and described them as "strained analogies and word
158. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 55 (D. Mass. 1990)
(citing Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1240 (3d Cir. 1986);
Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986)).
159. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D. Mass. 1990).
160. Id. at 66.
161. Id. at 67-68.
162. Id at 68.
163. Id.
164. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 68 (D. Mass. 1990).
165. Manufacturers Tech. v. Cams, 706 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D. Conn. 1989); Broderbund
Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-1134 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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games." '1 66 One argument, however, deserves some discussion.
The defendant argued that the plaintiffs only had literary work
copyright.167 They also alleged the infringement existed in the user
interface or screen displays which are audiovisual works. The court
responded with an unusually vituperative statement:
This contention borders on the frivolous. First, I emphati-
cally reject the defendants' premise, based on yet another word
game, that-equates the user interface of 1-2-3 with 1-2-3's "screen
displays." In ruling that defendants have infringed plaintiff's
copyright, I have not ruled that defendants are liable because
they copied the "screen displays" of 1-2-3. Rather, I have con-
cluded that defendants copied protected nonliteral elements of
expression in the user interface and the underlying computer
program. 
168
Again, this formulation follows Broderbund. Clearly, the
Broderbund, MTI, Johnson and Lotus courts have created a new
category of audiovisual copyright matter: the sequence of the au-
diovisual displays.
The Court gave a second reason why the plaintiff survived this
final argument: the literary work registration covers the visual dis-
plays generated by the program.169 The Copyright Office refused to
register a separate audiovisual copyright when Lotus applied for
it.170
166. 740 F. Supp. at 71.
Without going into excessive detail, the following were the defendants' first three argu-
ments and the Court's reasons for rejecting them:
First, the computer program was a "useful article" and hence not copyrightable. This
was rejected as a word play: though factually a "useful article" it could not be in copyright
law since it was the expressed intention of the legislature to protect computer programs. Id.
at 71-72.
Secondly, 1-2-3 has a "macro" facility which allows the user to write a short program to
perform certain steps automatically. This means it is a language and languages are not pro-
tectable. The court held, at its most fundamental, that 1-2-3 was not a language since the
macro facility is only part of 1-2-3, and it could be a language in any case since a language
cannot be a set of instructions, which 1-2-3 patently was. Id. at 72-73.
Thirdly, for the purposes of developers of programs there should be a "bright line" pol-
icy rule that only source and object code should be copyright and nonliteral elements never
should. This was a matter to be left to Congress, and the Court would not be goaded into
judicial lawmaking. Id. at 73.
167. Copyright Registration Nos., TX-1-233-501, TX-1-233-502 and TX-1-694-602.
168. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 79-80 (D. Mass,
1990).
169. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
170. 740 F. Supp. at 81-82.
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g. The Apple Cases
The Apple cases present somewhat more complicated facts.
The software in question pertained to not just one program but a
homogeneous set. The Macintosh User Interface, which controls
Apple's Macintosh computer, is a graphical not textual user inter-
face. It allows the user to control the computer without memo-
rizing long and complicated commands. A "move-and-point"
system controlled all functions which were graphically represented
on the screen. The system's simplicity and intuitiveness provided
the main reason for wide public acceptance of the Macintosh
computer. 171
The main operating system of the Macintosh is called the
Finder. However, most if not all application programs written for
the Macintosh conform to the specifications laid down by Apple for
software developers. Therefore a user can move between inumer-
able programs from different manufacturers and the user interface
will almost invariably appear the same. This avoids expensive
retraining.
Xerox v. Apple
Xerox allegedly developed parts of this interface, for use in
their Star project. The similarity of Star and the Macintosh Inter-
face gave rise to the suit in Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer Inc. 172
Xerox sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment to establish them
as the sole owner of Star's work copyright. They also sought an
order striking out the Macintosh copyright registrations for unlaw-
ful use of pre-existing copyrighted material. Xerox claimed that it
could not license Star because potential licensees feared that Apple
would sue them for copyright infringement of the Macintosh
Interface.173
The court did not examine the copyrightability of the user in-
terface, because an action for declaratory judgment requires the
existence of an actual controversy. The plaintiff must harbor a
"real and reasonable apprehension that he will be subject to liability
if he continues to manufacture his product."' 74 The court held that
171. Note for example that T. Turnpaugh, Senior Vice President of Technology Services
at Seattle First National Bank, said "the difference in learning to use the Mac[intosh] com-
pared to learning [a conventional machine] is about 8-to-1 in the Mac's favour." Laplante,
"Apple Offers Alternative to MS-DOS Machines," INFOWORLD, Oct 13, 1986, at 15.
172. 734 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
173. Ie at 1545.
174. Id. at 1546.
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since Apple had never threatened licensees with suit, they lacked
evidence to "support the existence of a 'real and reasonable appre-
hension of liability' on Xerox's part." 175
As to the order striking out Apple's copyright registration the
court decided simply that it did not have power to cancel copyrights
under the Copyright Act. 176
Round one now over, Apple stepped into the ring again, but
this time as plaintiff not defendant.
Apple v. Microsoft
Apple's Macintosh ranks second in market domination behind
IBM's PC. The PC originally did not have a graphical user inter-
face, and users had to memorize complicated commands. Various
manufacturers, IBM among them, realized the potential of an inter-
face like the Macintosh's. The race to develop a user interface like
the Macintosh for the PC was on.
Digital Research Inc. (DRI) created the first graphic user in-
terface: the Graphics Environment Manager (GEM). In the eyes of
more than one reviewer, it bore "a striking resemblance to the Mac-
intosh screen." 177 Apple threatened DRI with a copyright infringe-
ment suit on the basis of the emerging "look and feel" cases. The
case never came to court. As part of the settlement, DRI paid Ap-
ple an undisclosed sum, and agreed to alter certain aspects of GEM
to make it look less "Macintosh-like."1 78
Microsoft became involved next. It created the original, non-
graphical interface for the IBM PC, and created a new graphical
one called Windows LO. Windows LO had a number of similarities
with the Macintosh User Interface. Again Apple rattled their
sabres, and the parties reached an agreement in 1985. Part of that
agreement provides as follows:
2. Visual Copyright License from Apple
A. Grant. Apple hereby grants to Microsoft a nonexclu-
sive, worldwide, royalty-free, perpetual, nontransferable license
to use those derivative works [that is to say Windows LO and
other Microsoft programs] in present and future software pro-
grams and to license them to and through third parties for use in
their software programs. 179
175. Id. at 1547.
176. Id. at 1549.
177. Thompson, Bringing the Macintosh to the PC, INFOWORLD, June 10, 1985 at 43.
178. 4 COMPUTER L. REP. 338 (1985); Forbes, DRI Says New GEM Meets Apple'r
Terms', INFOWORLD, Nov. 11, 1985 at 1.
179. BIX law/litigation #551, from glass, April 18, 1988.
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Thus, they forestalled the issue, but not for long.
IBM brought out a new series of personal computers, called
the Personal System/2 (PS/2). It needed a new operating system,
and Microsoft agreed to write it. They called it the Operating Sys-
tem/2 (OS/2). Its user interface, the Presentation Manager or Win-
dows 2.03, looked similar to Windows 1.0. It was also more similar
to the Macintosh User Interface than Windows 1. 0.
To further confuse the issue, Hewlett-Packard created their
own user interface called New Wave. This interface was designed
for use with Windows 2.03, and also allegedly looked similar to the
Macintosh User Interface.1 80
With the PS/2 looking like a large success, Apple it seems,
wished to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt 81 in the minds of the
computer purchasers. Thus, Apple sued Hewlett-Packard, for al-
leged audiovisual copyright infringement and unfair competition.
They also sued Microsoft for contributory infringement.1 8 2
The judge divided the case into at least four separate judg-
ments. The first""3 dealt exclusively with contractual issues relating
to the 1985 settlement agreement. The Court held that the agree-
ment was confined only to Windows 1.0: "the parties... [inserted]
language showing an intent to limit the license and accompanying
release of claims to the visual displays in the then current version of
Windows, Version 1.0."84
In the second case18 the Court analyzed in detail the elements
of the Macintosh interface covered by the 1985 agreement. It ruled
that all the elements in Windows 1.0 could be used in Windows 2.03
without infringement. The only substantive elements of similarity
not licensed included the ability to move icons18 6 on the screen and
the use of windows which overlapped and were not "tiled."18 7
180. It has been suggested that it is actually different in look, but that it is possible to re-
configure the screen display. It was further suggested that Microsoft worked very hard to re-
configure New Wave to look as much like the Macintosh as possible. BIX law/litigation
#558 from glass, April 18, 1988.
181. Sterlicchi, Mr. Nice Guy Era Ends With FUD Plot, COMpUrING AUSTRALIA,
March 28, 1988 at 12.
182. Apple complaint filed March 17, 1988 in the U.S. District Court in San Jose. Copy
in BIX law/texts #78 from glass, March 20, 1988.
183. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
184. Id. at 928
185. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
186. Icons are pictorial representations of programs and files on the screen. They allow
the user to "see" the file.
187. Windows are the main working area of GUIs. Windows 1.0 only allowed "tiled"
windows, i.e. windows which sat side by side. Windows 2.03, like the Macintosh, allows
windows to overlap.
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Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard obtained a partial summary judg-
ment leaving the most important copyright issues undecided.
The third case, Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation
and Hewlett Packard Company18" filed recently, dealt with a
number of subsidiary motions for partial summary judgment. 18 9
The substantive copyright issues remain for the next phase. When
and if this phase goes to trial is anybody's guess.
However, the court's examination of the license demonstrates
that it is not adopting Broderbund's principle that the sequence of
the displays is copyrightable. The Judge has narrowed the copy-
right issue to the elements discussed above. Indeed in the third
case, the court said, "Implicit in Judge Schwarzer's approach to the
case is a rejection of Apple's fundamental contention that the 'total
concept and feel' of the Macintosh graphic user interface is protect-
able expression." 190 Thus it appears likely that the court will deal
with the "look and feel" issue as exclusively within audiovisual
copyright principles.
h. Conclusion
What are we left with after these cases? 191 Is "look and feel"
really so threatening to the very fabric of copyright law in the
188. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C 88-21149 VRW (N.D. Cal. filed 6
March 1991) (1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2910).
189. These motions were: Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the ba-
sis that the licensed Microsoft Excel displays are identical to the Macintosh, Hewlett Packard
motion for partial summary judgment on the basis that Hewlett Packard's New Wave dis-
plays are covered by the 1985 Agreement, and Apple's motion for partial summary judgment
concerning validity of its copyrights. All motions were decided in Apple's favor.
190. Id. at 51.
191. There are two peripherally relevant cases, Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Inter-
continental, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ohio 1986) and Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel
Learning Sys., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Tex. 1986), which are dangerous anomalies.
Both cases involve the same electromechanically animated stuffed toy bear, called Teddy
Ruxpin. The manufacturer of Teddy Ruxpin sued the two defendants for producing audio
tapes which caused Teddy Ruxpin to move and speak in the same way as it did when playing
its tapes. The courts compared the visual effect of Teddy Ruxpin when activated by the
plaintiff and defendants' tapes, and found a substantial similarity in "concept and feel." 653
F. Supp. at 139.
The court's analysis with respect, completely ignores the fundamental point: can the
animated movements of the bear be copyrighted at all? The answer is clearly no. The only
category it falls within is an audiovisual work, and it fails to gain protection due to operation
of the "utilitarian article" doctrine. Furthermore if a tape controlling the movements of the
bear infringed the copyright in the facial features, then there is no reason why a battery
powering the movements would not also infringe the copyright in the movements, provided
W.O.W. also manufactured batteries for the bear. (For this example I am indebted to Boor-
styn, Infringement of Software Copyright, CAL. LAW., October, 1987 at 51). This logical non
sequitur demonstrates the dangerous nature of these two decisions. These cases should be,
and largely have been, ignored.
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United States? The answer to this lies in the various reasonings of
the courts.
Two decisions found purely audiovisual copyright in display
screens, just as the courts did in the video game cases. These two
cases are DCA and Brown Bag. Judging by the court's comments in
the third Apple case, it appears that this decision will be decided in
the same way. Both DCA and Brown Bag dissected the screen ele-
ments and determined if they were copyright. This is a standard
application of audiovisual copyright, and should not be regarded as
controversial.
There are four cases which have introduced a new copyright
element: non-literal expression. The non-literal expression in this
area is the sequence of the screens. These four cases are
Broderbund, MTI, Johnson and Lotus.
Is this new element of display sequence properly within the
bounds of copyright? The courts have been careful only to protect
non-literal expression and it is therefore impossible to argue that
this destroys the idea/expression dichotomy. The arguments
against protection for screen sequence are similar to those posited
against protecting program structure after Whelan. As I have al-
ready shown these arguments are fallacious and the same holds true
for the arguments against protecting display sequence.
Provided then that the courts seek only to protect expression
there is no good reason why "look and feel" should not be pro-
tected. "Look and feel" does break new ground, but the report of
the copyright's death at the hands of "look and feel" is "an
exaggeration." 192
III. "LOOK AND FEEL" iN AUSTRALIA
The Anglo-Australian jurisdiction has yet to analyze the "look
and feel" issue.193 Therefore, any examination of this issue in Aus-
tralia consists of mere speculation. However, a review of the poten-
tial fields of law which may apply in a look and feel dispute will
help determine a litigant's probable outcome. In this chapter the
Australian law of copyright, passing off, unfair competition, and
unfair trade practices will be examined and related to the "look and
feel" issue.
To anchor this discussion as deeply as possible, this article will
192. "The report of my death was an exaggeration." S.L.CLEMENS (Mark Twain),
[Cable from Europe to the Associated Press], reported in J. COHEN, THE PENGUIN BOOK OF
QUOTATIONS, at 401 (1960).
193. Note however the two cases infra pp. 146-48, Cases.
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apply the Australian law to particular fact situations. Since no
Australian cases exist, the "standard" United States "look and feel"
fact situation will provide the perspective. Digital Communications
Associates v. Softklone Distributing Corp. 194 and Lotus Development
Corp. v. Paperback Software International 195 represent the best ex-
amples of the standard situation.19 6 In both those cases a large
manufacturer invested substantial effort in creating a program inter-
face. A "clone-maker" deliberately replicated the "look and feel"
of the interface. The "clone" looked and worked exactly the same
as the original, but sold at a considerably lower price. Manufactur-
ers advertised extensively to inform potential buyers of the differ-
ences between the two products. 197
A. Copyright as a Form of "Look and Feel" Protection
Australian and American law are generally very similar. They
have identical policy considerations and stem initially from the Stat-
ute of Anne1 98 and its predecessors.1 99
As in the United States,"°° the Australian Copyright Act 1968
(Cth.) requires two elements to find a defendant liable for illegal
copying. First, copyright must subsist in the plaintiff's material.
This means the material must be original, in the correct form, and
contained within the categories enumerated in the Act. Secondly,
the defendant's work must infringe the plaintiff's copyrighted work.
Infringement depends largely on the substantial similarity be-
tween the works and whether a large part of the original work was
reproduced. This chapter examines these two elements and their re-
spective requirements.
1. Subsistence
a. Categories
The Act categorizes many materials protected by copyright.
194. DCA v. Softklone, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987); see infra p. 124.
195. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass 1990).
196. This example has the following benefits:
1. No "mistaken" copying occurred in the example;
2. Courts decided both cases used for the example in the plaintiff's favor in the United
States. The example therefore represents a useful benchmark for the extent of the protection
in the United States. I shall note where the Australian law would apply differently to a
different fact situation.
197. See supra note 126 and associated text.
198. 8 Anne, c.19 (1709).
199. See generally S.RCKETSON,,LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 57-81 (1984).
200. See infra p. 105.
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These materials include literary, dramatic, musical and artistic
works,20 1 sound recordings, 202 cinematographic films,2"3 television
and sound broadcasts, 2° and published editions of works.205 Only
two categories of works apply to the "look and feel" question: liter-
ary and artistic works. Although a stumbling block may exist for
computer programs categorized as literary works, the artistic works
category should provide protection for computer displays as
drawings.
Literary Works
The literary works category now protects computer programs.
In response to a celebrated case that declined to protect object
code,20 6 Parliament enacted the Copyright Amendment Act 1984
(Cth.). 20 7 The Act altered its definition of "literary work" to ex-
pressly include computer programs or computer program
compilations. 208
The Act defines "computer program" as any instruction, in
any form of expression, which causes a device having digital
processing capabilities to perform a particular function.20 9 Thus,
the Copyright Act clearly recognizes computer programs as literary
works, and hence protects them from iterative copying in Australia.
Less clearly protected within the definition of "literary work"
are "compilations. '210 A selection or compilation of materials ap-
plies to an arrangement of text and graphics on a computer display.
Therefore, a computer display could attract copyright protection as
a "literary work." However, literary works inter alia must exist in
"material form. ' 211 The cathode ray tube of a computer like a tele-
vision screen must continually refresh an image anywhere from
thirty to sixty times per second, in order for viewers to see a pic-
201. Copyright Act (1986) § 32.
202. Copyright Act (1986) § 89.
203. Copyright Act (1986) § 90.
204. Copyright Act (1986) § 91.
205. Copyright Act (1986) § 92.
206. Computer Edge Pty. Ltd. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 161 C.L.R. 171, 65 A.L.R. 33
(1986).
207. The impetus behind the enactment was in fact the case when at first instance. Ap-
ple Computer Inc. v. Computer Edge Pty. Ltd. 50 A.L.R. 581 (1983).
208. Copyright Amendment Act (1984) § 10(1).
209. Copyright Amendment Act (1984) § 10(1). This section of the Amendment Act
also altered the requirement that the literary work be in visible form and made non-visible
works, such as object code, copyrightable.
210. Copyright Amendment Act (1984) § 10(1). Note that this does not refer to compi-
lations of programs covered in § 10(l1)(b), but to compilations of material generally.
211. Copyright Act (1986) § 22.
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ture.212 Judges will unlikely find this inconstancy to amount to
"material form," since one cannot reproduce the work from the
screen image.213 Due to this evanescence, it seems that a "look and
feel" plaintiff could not claim copyright as a literary work in the
screen display.
The way United States courts have side-stepped this issue will
not assist an Australian plaintiff.214 In Stern v. Kaufman215 the rep-
etition of images provided sufficient fixation to attract copyright
protection.21 6 However, subsequent cases never directly raised the
issue.
Artistic Works
Section 10(1) defines an "artistic work" as
(a) a painting, sculpture, drawing, engraving or photo-
graph, whether of artistic quality or not;
(b) a building or a model of a building, whether of artistic
quality or not; or
(c) a work of artistic craftsmanship to which neither of the
last preceeding paragraphs applies.217
Only paragraph (a) could arguably protect computer screen
displays as a painting or drawing.218 Unfortunately, the Act fails to
define painting. Ricketson 219 suggests that a computer display
could be categorized as a painting because it only requires color
placement220 on a two dimensional surface.221 He suggests that
provided that the painting is substantial enough to merit protec-
212. Though a television or computer screen appears stable, the phosphor which glows
creating the picture must be regularly bombarded with electrons in order for a picture to
remain on the screen. This refresh is performed automatically by circuitry in the screen. See
generally A. CAKIR & D. HART, VISUAL DISPLAY TERMINALS 9-12 (1980); C. Lu, THE
APPLE MACINTOSH BOOK 154 (2d ed. 1985).
213. As required by Copyright Amendment Act (1984) § 22.
214. See supra pp. 111-15, The Audiovisual Work Stream.
215. Stem Elecs. Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
216. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
217. Therefore artistic works require no artistic or aesthetic quality, except with works
of artistic craftsmanship.
218. Obviously, paragraph 10(b) is irrelevant to a discussion of "look and feel," since a
building is unlikely to be a computer program. Paragraph 10(c) is also inapplicable to this
discussion. The paragraph was intended to protect works other than those in paragraph
10(a), and which were manufactured by craftsmen working in many media. REPORT OF THE
COPYRIGHT COMMITTEE, Cmnd. 8662, H.M.S.O., London (1952) para. 260.
219. See S. RICKETSON, supra note 196.
220. Including monochrome images.
221. S. RICKETSON, supra note 196 at 117.
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tion2 2 2 practically any representation should satisfy the section.
The screen image is two dimensional,223 which can be either in
color or monochrome. There is no requirement of aesthetic quality,
so even a textual screen should be covered by this provision.
The screen image may also be categorized as a drawing. A
drawing is usually a line depiction in monochrome, and includes a
diagram, map, chart or plan.224 In addition, many works outside
this definition have been protected by this section; such as labels
225
and lettering.226 Therefore, since drawings are essentially mono-
chrome paintings, the analysis supporting the Act's protection of
computer screen displays as paintings applies also to drawings. 227
On the basis of the above analysis, there seems to be no reason
why this section could not sustain a "look and feel" action. Judicial
reluctance could pose a stumbling block toward extending the Act's
definition of paintings or drawings into the electronic media.22 As
a result, whether Australian courts adopt the stance that the screen
images constitute "artistic works" remains to be seen.
b. Originality
All works must be original.229 The University of London Press
court held that original did not mean creative or novel in the sense
of patents, but determined the test was whether the expression of
the idea stems from the author claiming copyright.230 Ladbroke v.
222. In Merchandising Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Harpbound Ltd. (trading as Scansfeed Pub-
lication), 1983 F.S.R. 32, three stripes of paint were held to be too insubstantial to warrant
protection. There was also some question of whether a painting could be applied to a three
dimensional surface.
223. Ignoring the curvature of most cathode ray tubes. Nowadays FTM (Flat Tension
Mask) screens are available, which are perfectly flat.
224. Copyright Amendment Act § 10(1).
225. Smith Bros. (Whitehaven) Ltd. v. Redfearn, 131 L.T. Jo. 318 (1911); Taverner Rut-
ledge Ltd. v. Spectyers Ltd., 1959 R.P.C. 8 (C.A.); H. Klarmann Ltd. v. Henshaw Linen
Supplies, 1960 R.P.C. 150.
226. Stephenson, Blake & Co. v. Grant, Legros, & Co., 33 R.P.C. 406 (1916); Mason
Seeley & Co. v.-Embosotyope Mfg., 1924 R.P.C. 160.
227. There is no requirement that the work be in material form, as only literary, dra-
matic or musical works need be. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
228. The courts have not yet faced the issue. Traditionally, courts have only held copy-
right to subsist in plans, machine drawings, charts and diagrams. See J. LAHORE, COPY-
RiGHT LAW, paras. [2.3.90], [2.3.105] (1977). In the case of Merchandising Corp. of Am. v.
Harpbound Ltd, 1983 F.S.R. 32, the English Court of Appeal refused to find that makeup on
a face was a painting, on the basis that the surface of the face formed part of the painting and
the plaintiff could not copyright his face. Whether courts will apply the reasoning of this case
to electronic surfaces is speculative.
229. University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press.
230. Id.; see also Sands v. Robinson, 23 C.L.R. 49 (1917).
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William Hill2"' developed a second test. This test asks whether the
author expended a degree of labor, skill and ingenuity sufficient to
justify protection.232 The High Court in Computer Edge v. Apple233
combined these elements into a two stage test. The first prong asks
whether the work originated from the author. The second asks if
such a degree of labor, skill and ingenuity has been expended to
merit copyright protection.
Generally, these two questions are simply factual. In the stan-
dard "look and feel" scenario, the work clearly emanates from the
plaintiff manufacturer. Secondly, as seen in the DCA case, the man-
ufacturer expends a great deal of skill, labor and expense to create
the "look and feel. ' ' 234 Thus the standard "look and feel" case
clearly satisfies the requirement of originality.
However, the analysis becomes slightly more difficult when the
work at issue is a compilation of prior material.235 If a common-
place or typical arrangement of existing material makes up the
work, then it will not be protected.236 However, if an expenditure
of labor, skill and ingenuity sufficiently distinguishes the work from
prior material, it will be protected.237 Also, if "look and feel"
screens are commonplace they will not be protected. Screens are
likely to be commonplace if they contain purely textual displays in
an ordinary "laundry list" format. Beyond that, it will depend on
the facts. For example, the Crosstalk status screen in DCA would
probably not be commonplace, due to its involved structure.238
Further, the unusual graphical display of the Macintosh Interface,
would almost certainly pass the originality test.
c. The Nature of Copyright in Works
Section 31 expresses the nature of copyright in works. The
copyright holder has the exclusive right to do any of the acts al-
231. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273; [1964] 1 All E.R. 465.
232. The amount of labor, skill and ingenuity required depends on the facts of the case.
In Ladbroke Ltd. v. William Hill Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. at 277-78, 282, 285 the court found
that creating a moderately complicated football betting coupon was a sufficient expenditure of
labor, skill and ingenuity.
233. 65 A.L.R. 33 (1986).
234. See Dailey, Case Comment" Digital Communications Association, Inc. v. Softklone
Distributing Corporation, The "Look and Feel" of Copyrightable Expression, 8 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 234 (1987).
235. Compilations are protected as literary works, see supra note 213 and accompanying
text.
236. G.A. Cramp v. Frank Smythson Ltd., 1944 A.C. 329.
237. Ladbroke v. William Hill, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 283; [19,64] 1 All E.R. 465.
238. See supra pp. 118-19, DCA v. Softklone.
[Vol. 7
1991] PROTECTING THE "LOOK AND FEEL" 137
lowed by section 31. These acts differ depending on whether the
work is literary, artistic, dramatic or musical.239
For copyright purposes, the only relevant right is the right to
reproduce the work. The next section examines what amounts to a
reproduction, and the effect of these rights.
2. Infringement
Of all possible infringements, 24° the most important one is "do-
ing of the acts comprised in the copyright."241
a Doing the Acts Comprised in the Copyright
Section 36 makes a tort of any infringement of one or more of
the exclusive rights granted by section 31.242 Copyright protects an
owner's rights from an exact reproduction or copy, but how much
copying or reproduction is allowed? Difficult issues arise when
considering:
1. How much of the work must be copied for infringement?
239. For literary works the copyright holder has the exclusive right to do all or any of
the following acts under § 32(l)(a):
(i) to reproduce the work in a material form;
(ii) to publish the work;
(ii) to perform the work in public;
(iv) to broadcast the work,
(v) to cause the work to be transmitted to subscribers of a diffusion ser-
vice;
(vi) to make an adaptation of the work;
(vii) to do any of the acts in (i) to (v) above in relation to an adaptation of
the work.
In the case of artistic works, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to do any or all
of the following acts pursuant to § 31(l)(b):
(i) to reproduce the work in the material form;
(ii) to publish the work;
(iii) to include the work in a television broadcast;
(iv) to cause a television programme [sic] that includes the work to be
transmitted to subscribers of a diffusion service.
240. The following acts are infringement of the copyright in a work:
1. doing the acts comprised in the copyright (§ 36);
2. authorizing the doing of the acts comprised in the copyright (§ 36);
3. knowingly importing articles which would infringe copyright if made
in Australia (§ 37);
4. knowingly selling, letting for hire, or trading an article which in-
fringes copyright, or if imported would infringe copyright (§ 38);
5. permitting a place of public entertainment to be used for the public
performance of works, without the copyright owner's consent (§ 39).
241. The others are aimed at importers, retailers and distributors.
242. See infra pp. 142-43, The Nature of Copyright in Works.
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2. How closely must the alleged copy reproduce the original
for infringement?
The following section discusses how the case law addresses
these issues.
b. Substantiality of the Taking
If a "substantial part" of the work is infringed pursuant to the
infringement provision, then the whole work will be infringed.243
The case law defines what constitutes a substantial part by consider-
ing a number of factors. The first and most important factor meas-
ures the quality of what is taken. If the copy reproduces an
essential, vital, or material part of the work, it will infringe the
work, even if it constitutes only a small quantity.2' This test favors
the plaintiff, because the most fundamental elements of the "look
and feel" program are appropriated. A second factor, quantity, also
favors the plaintiff since the entire "look and feel" of the plaintiff's
work is taken.
Another factor evaluates the originality of the part taken. If
copied material consists of only unoriginal reproduction, it will not
form a substantial part of the work, no matter what the quantity.245
Antithetically, if even a small part of the work is highly creative,
then it may be considered a substantial part.246 Again this analysis
favors the "look and feel" plaintiff. The references to expenditures
incurred in the creation of the program in DCA bear testament to
this.247
A fourth factor analyzes the object of the taking. If the defend-
ants appropriated the part of the work with animusfurandi,248 then
the court will more likely find a substantial part of the work copied.
This is true even though the elements taken are not a substantial
percentage of the work.249 However, if the defendants sought
merely to illustrate a proposition, or their object was incidental to
the main purpose of the authorship, then courts will find no sub-
stantial taking.25 0 By saving themselves the labor of research to cre-
243. Copyright Act (1986) § 14.
244. See generally S. RiCKMON, supra note 196, at 169 n.9.
245. Ladbroke Ltd. v. William Hill Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 283; [1964] 1 All E.R. 465.
246. Baumann v. Fussell, 1978 R.P.C. 485.
247. See supra note 126.
248. An intent to steal and hence save themselves the labor of research.
249. Ravenscroft v. Herbert, 1980 R.P.C. 193.
250. Joy Music Ltd. v. Sunday Pictorial Newspapers, [1960] 1 All E.R. 703 (taking used
for a parody); Chappell & Co. v. D.C. Thompson & Co., [1928-35] MacG. Cop. Cas. 467
(taking from a song used for a novel's chapter heading).
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ate an improved program, the "look and feel" "clone-makers" seek
to ride the coat tails of the original manufacturer. Thus, in "look
and feel" cases the defendant clearly has animusfurandi.
The last factor measures whether the materials are in competi-
tion. If so, the court will likely find a substantial taking, and will
even disregard its insignificance in order to prevent rivals from gain-
ing an unfair economic advantage.2 ' This factor obviously favors
"look and feel" plaintiffs since the manufacturers are in direct com-
petition, and the clone-maker is undercutting the original
manufacturer.
It is therefore hard to imagine a clearer example of substantial
taking on any of the above tests, than the production of a "look and
feel" clone.
c. Substantial Similarity
What degree of similarity constitutes infringement? Just as in
the United States, the courts require "substantial similarity" or a
close objective similarity.252 Similarity forms the first stage in a two
stage test. It is necessary so one can properly describe the defend-
ant's work as a reproduction or adaptation of the plaintiff's.253 The
second part of the test mandates, unsurprisingly, that a causal con-
nection exists between the two works. 54 Plaintiffs usually prove
this causal connection by a defendant's access to the copyrighted
work. The causal connection will always be found in a "look and
feel" case. Obviously the defendant must have had access to the
plaintiff's work in order to mimic the appearance and function of
the work so closely.
d. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
As in the United States, Australian copyright law protects ex-
pression and not the idea. The concept of "indispensable expres-
sion" also applies in Australia, although courts do not use the terms
"doctrine of merger," "scenes a faire" and "indispensable expres-
sion," but instead favor "vieux jeu" and "common stock."2 The
United States cases which denied protection on the basis that ex-
pression was inseparable from the idea would probably have the
251. Blackie & Sons v. Lothian Book Publishing, 29 C.L.R. 396 (1921); Bradbury v.
Hotten, VIII L.R. Ex. 1 at 5, (1872).
252. Francis Day v. Bron, 1963 Ch. 587; [1963] 2 All E.R. 16; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 868.
253. 1963 Ch. at 627.
254. Id.
255. See e.g., Poznanski v. London Film Prod. Ltd., [1936-45] McG. Cop. Cas. 107.
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same result if tried in Australia. 56
The issue of scenes afaire or vieuxjeu arises where the need to
communicate with the user dictates the program's "look and feel."
Elements in a program's display which extend beyond the underly-
ing idea, are protected by copyright, since they do not fall within
"common stock. ' 257
The issue of "look and feel" as merely a "blank form" also
relates to the doctrine of merger issue. This was the fatal issue in
Synercom 25 Australia lacks a specific body of case law which has
adopted the "blank form" doctrine. However, the application of
the originality test achieves the same answer.259 If the work only
constitutes a "blank form" it will lack sufficient labour, skill, and
ingenuity to warrant copyright protection. However, in the stan-
dard look and feel case the manufacturers will have expended suffi-
cient labour to create the look and feel of a program, given the man-
hours taken to design and program. 2" This is the same result
achieved in the United States by application of the "blank form"
doctrine.26'
3. Cases
Two cases exist within the Anglo-Australian jurisdiction which
touch on "look and feel" issues. One judge from England's Chan-
cery Division of the High Court of Justice decided the first case.
Since it was an interlocutory proceeding,262 it bears marginal influ-
ence.263 The second is the Autodesk case which after a controversial
decision in the Federal Court2' 6 was resolved on appeal.265
a. M.S. Associates v. Power
The plaintiff in M.S. Associates v. Power developed and mar-
keted software which translated other people's BASIC language
256. See eg. supra, Patry, W.F., 30-35.
257. Poznanski v. Landon Film Prod. Ltd., [1936-45] McG. Cop. Cas. 107.
258. See supra note 45.
259. See supra pp. 141-42, Originality.
260. See eg., excerpt from page 9 of Transcript of Proceeding of Digital Communica-
tions Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385
(N.D. Ga. 1987).
261. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
262. M.S. Assocs. Ltd. v. Power, 1988 F.S.R. 242.
263. For a summary of the hierarchy of Australian court see SMrrH, LEGAL PROCESS,
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 36-38 (Maher ed. 5th ed. 1988).
264. Autodesk, Inc. v. Martin Peter Dyason, 15 I.P.R. 1 (1989).
265. Martin Peter Dyason v. Autodesk, Inc., 18 I.P.R. 109 (1990).
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programs to the computer language, C.2 6 6 The defendant; a former
employee of the plaintiff, wrote an identical program.
The judge looked at the two programs' code and the structure
to determine infringement.267 The judge noted, "the striking line
similarity at the beginning of the defendants' program and its order
with the list of functions in the plaintiffs' program, a list which is in
random order. 268
He went on to detail the similarities in structure; such as
groupings of functions and file structure. This analysis closely re-
sembled Whelan S269 structure, sequence, and organization test for
literary work copyright infringement.
Since this case dealt with literary work copyright, it does not
directly relate to "look and feel" copyright.27 ° Applying Whelan in
audiovisual "look and feel" cases has had somewhat illogical re-
sults. 27' Computer program structure's copyrightability is largely
hypothetical within this article's context, however the policy con-
siderations discussed in relation to Whelan apply equally in
Australia.272
b. The Autodesk Cases
The plaintiffs marketed an expensive computer-aided drafting
program called AutoCAD. This program has a small, plastic-en-
cased microchip that slots into the serial port of the personal com-
puter. This microchip, called the AutoCAD lock, regularly receives
a code from part of AutoCAD called WIDGET.C. If the correct
signal does not return from the lock, AutoCAD freezes and will not
operate.
One of the defendants analyzed the signal from AutoCAD and
the AutoCAD lock and discovered a pattern could be replicated
without opening the AutoCAD lock. He then coded the pattern in
an EPROM271 and the other defendants marketed the device as the
"Auto-Key." The Auto-Key allowed copyright infringers to use
AutoCAD, rendering Autodesk's safeguards useless.
266. These types of programs are generically known as "cross-compilers."
267. The case concerned a motion for an interlocutory injunction where the plaintiff's
burden of proof was simply that they have an arguable case, and is not decided on the merits.
268. M.S. Assocs. Ltd. v. Power, 1988 F.S.R. 242, 248.
269. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
270. See supra pp. 121-37, The "Look and Feel" Cases.
271. See supra pp. 116-18, Broderbund v. Unison World and pp. 122-23, Telemarketing
Resources v. Symantec.
272. See supra pp. 130-31, Conclusion.
273. Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory.
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On appeal from a single judge274 the Full Federal Court ad-
dressed the issues of subsistence of copyright and infringement, in-
ter alia.275 In the leading judgment, Sheppard, J. stated that
copyright subsisted in the work. As to infringement, he said:
"[T]he only similarity between the two locks is the fact that they
perform the same function. There is no other similarity of any con-
sequence." '276 He therefore found there was no reproduction.277
As with M.S. Associates, this case has only a passing relevance
to the standard "look and feel" case, such as DCA or Lotus. No
question of audiovisual work infringement exists. This case once
again mirrors Whelan making the comments discussing the similar-
ity between M.S. Associates and Whelan applicable.27 s The funda-
mental question asks whether the AutoKey lock infringes any non-
literal elements of the AutoCAD lock. These non-literal elements
can be categorized as "structure, sequence, and organization" of the
code, or the visual elements of the display. The relevant non-literal
element can only be the "structure, sequence, and organization" of
the pattern code. Since this element was not copied, the Full Fed-
eral Court accordingly dismissed the action. This harmonizes with
the analysis of the United States cases.27 9 As a result, the Autodesk
case adds little to the "look and feel" debate.
4. Conclusion
Australian copyright closely resembles its American counter-
part. A potential "look and feel" plaintiff faces two fundamental
problems in Australia. First, the section relied on for look and feel
protection in the United States is actually "audiovisual work" copy-
right. No exact Australian equivalent exists, but "artistic work"
copyright is the closest. Although no judicial barriers hinder the
courts, it is unclear whether the Australian courts will extend "ar-
tistic works" into electronic images.
Secondly, American courts have a more liberal approach to
274. Autodesk, Inc. v. Dyason, 15 I.P.R. 1 (1989).
275. Dyason v. Autodesk, Inc., 18 I.P.R. 109 (1990).
276. Id. at 136.
277. The judge also examined whether the Auto-Key lock was an adaptation of the Auto-
CAD lock. He looked at the different algorithms used in each lock and pronounced simply
that it would be impossible to say that the Auto-Key lock was a variant oftheAutoCAD lock
The other judges concurred in all important respects with Justice Sheppard. The appeal was
unanimously allowed. Autodesk was granted leave to appeal to the High Court. The appeal
was heard on 17 April 1991. At the time of the writing, the court has yet to hand down a
judgment.
278. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
279. See supra pp. 130-31, Conclusion.
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precedent and generally interpret statutes more flexibly than courts
in Australia. U.S. federal courts have largely ignored the fixation
question for computer displays. It seems unlikely that an Austra-
lian court would be flexible as this, nor would the author argue that
they should be.
All one can confidently say, is that the future of "look and
feel" copyright protection in Australia is uncertain.
B. Passing Off as a Form of "Look and Feel" Protection
Passing off is a form of intellectual property similar in effect to
registered trademarks. Unlike trademarks however, passing off
concerns the protection of the reputation or goodwill amassed by
the plaintiff, rather than protection of the mark.8 0 Passing off oc-
curs when a defendant holds himself out as having an association
with a plaintiff or plaintiff's goods or services, and in so doing
causes damage to the plaintiff's goodwill or reputation.
1. Subject Matter
Like trademarks, passing off protects a manufacturer or dis-
tributor's insignia, mark or device on goods.2"' This protection
eventually extended to include the plaintiff's get-up,28 2 appearance,
and any conduct which tends to associate the defendant with the
plaintiff's already established reputation. 3
However, the court will not protect the mark or get-up as
property. The property actually protected is the business goodwill
or reputation established by the plaintiff.28 4 What amounts to repu-
tation has been given a wide definition by the courts. Any benefit or
advantage gained by possession of a good name or reputation will
be sufficient to discharge this requirement.2 5
280. Spalding (A.G.) & Bros. v. Gammage Ltd., 32 R.P.C. 273 (1915); Erven Warnink
Besloten Vennootschap v. Townend & Sons, 1979 A.C. 731, [1979] 2 All E.R. 927; see S.
RIcKETSON, supra note 196, at 534.
281. See generally S. RIcKmESON, supra note 196, at 533 n.13, for a list of example cases
with respect to goods.
282. In Anglo-Australian law, get-up is the traditional and technical name for the visual
identity of the product. This includes advertising, labelling, etc.
283. Knott v Morgan, 2 Keen 218 (1836), 48 E.R. 610; Lee v. Haley, L.R. 5 Ch. App
155 (1869); Levy v. Walker, 10 Ch. 436 (1878).
284. Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap v. Townend & Sons, 1979 A.C. 731, 1980
R.P.C. 31, [1979] 2 All E.R. 927, 932-33, 940-41.
285. Inland Revenue Comm'r v. Muller & Co., 1901 A.C. 217; Erven Warnink Besloten
Vennootschap v. Townend & Sons, 1979 A.C. 731, 1980 R.P.C. 31, [1979] 2 All E.R. 927.
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2. Elements Required
Passing off has gone through a number of modifications in its
lengthy history, but the modem requirements remain quite clear.
They are threefold:
1. The plaintiff must have a reputation or goodwill which
is attached to the mark, appearance or get-up;
2. The defendant must have used the same or a deceptively
similar mark or get-up so as to confuse or deceive the people who
purchase the goods or services;
3. The defendant's conduct must have caused, or is likely
to cause, the plaintiff damage to business goodwill or
reputation. 28
6
The next section shall examine each of these elements as they
apply to the standard "look and feel" case.287
a Reputation in the Mark or Get-up
The question of whether the plaintiff has a reputation which
deserves protection will invariably be answered in the affirmative.
Large, accepted companies with their established programs and
leading market share, provide smaller companies with a reason to
manufacture a clone.
However, a more difficult question arises with respect to
whether the visual appearance and function of the program
amounts to a mark or get-up. Clearly it is not a mark, since a mark
identifies a product to the consumer. In the case of a computer
program the "look and feel" does not identify the product, it is the
product.
For example, one might think that the way the Apple Macin-
tosh interface worked and looked, constituted get-up. This is not so.
The court recognizes a difference between similarity in the get-ups
and similarity in the actual products. As Fletcher Moulton, L.J.
said in Williams Co. v. Bronnley & Co.,288 "I strongly object to look
286. Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap v. Townend & Sons, 1979 A.C. 731, 1980
R.P.C. 31, [1979] 2 All E.R. 927; Cadbury-Schweppes Pty. Ltd. v. Pub Squash Co., 32
A.L.R. 387 (1980); Fletcher Challenge Ltd. v. Fletcher Challenge Pty. Ltd., [1981] 1
N.S.W.L.R. 196.
287. R. Stem, Software as a sensory experience: Can there be a passing off by imitation of
the "look and feel" of a computer program, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 195 (1986). Stem
notes a case which was pending in the United States, Cadam v. Adra Sys. & Adage, Inc., (D.
Mass. No. C-86-2146-T, 1986) which alleged passing off. The case did not go to trial, but if it
had, it would have probably been argued on the basis of copyright, as many previous cases
have been.
288. J.B. Williams Co. v. H. Bronnley & Co., 26 R.P.C. 765 (CA) (1909).
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at anything, that has a value in use, as part of the get-up of the
article. Anything which is in itself useful appears to me rightly to
belong to the article itself."28 9 This principle conclusively bars any
would-be "look and feel" plaintiff from bringing their action in
passing off because the interface has a "value in use" and is not part
of the get-up. However, this section shall nonetheless examine the
other requirements necessary for passing off, in the interests of
completeness.
b. Conduct of Defendant
The defendant's conduct matters, since it forms the fundamen-
tal element embodied in passing off. The defendant must have acted
to deceive or confuse customers into believing that their goods or
services were the plaintiffs or were associated with the plaintiff. The
defendant need not have fraudulent or deceitful intent, but must
have acted in such a way that confused purchasers. 2'
In the "look and feel" cases, defendants will rarely represent
themselves or their goods as associated with the plaintiff. The over-
all marketing thrust made by clone manufacturers portrays their
product as functionally identical to the original, but cheaper since it
comes from the clone-maker.29'
This observation is particularly forceful when one evaluates the
product's market. The more discriminating .the class of potential
consumers, the less likely the court will infer confusion resulting
from a similar get-up. Thus, the court assumed newspaper readers
could differentiate between the Morning Post and Evening Post,292
but "the humble washerwoman" was unable to notice the difference
between similar boxes of laundry powder.293 The purchasers of the
"look and feel" programs would distinguish the two programs for
three reasons. First, ordinary computer users are generally well-
289. Id at 773. Other authorities for this proposition include: Benchairs Ltd. v. Chair
Centre Ltd., 1974 R.P.C. 429, 436; Politoys, Ipari Szovetkezet & Ors v. Dallas Print Trans-
fers Ltd., 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. D-57 (1982); Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty.
Ltd. v. Puxu Pty. Ltd., 42 A.L.R. 1, 25 (1982); 56 A.L.J.R. 715, 728; Terrapin Ltd. v. Aris-
ton Bldg. Ltd., 1964 F.S.R. 218, 221; British Am. Glass Co. v. Winton Prods. Ltd, 1962
R.P.C. 230, 232; Hawkins & Tipson Ltd. v. Fludes Carpets Ltd., 1957 R.P.C. 8, 11.
290. See S. RICKETSON, supra note 196, at 533.
291. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
292. Borthwick v. The Evening Post, 37 Ch.D. 449 (1888).
293. William Edge & Sons Ltd. v. William Niccolls & Sons Ltd., 1911 AC. 693. Ignor-
ing the inherent sexism of the day note should be made of the fact that the washing powders
had identical get-up, whereas the newspapers had different layouts, content and styles. Rick-
etson suggests the result may have been different if the papers had been of a similar type. S.
RICKETSON, supra note 196, at 566.
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educated. Second, and more importantly, the computer media at-
tention to the look and feel issue has been most intense.294 Third,
average users could not help but notice the disparity in price. If
they don't, the clone manufacturer will quickly bring it to their
attention.295
c. Damage
Unlike most torts, passing off damage is limited to damage to
the plaintiff's goodwill. If passing off applied in the the "look and
feel" arena, courts would probably find damages once similarity in
the goods or services and consumer confusion was proved.296 Since
a program and its "look and feel" clone could not appear more sim-
ilar, the issue of damages will not bar the "look and feel" plaintiff.
3. Conclusion
Passing off will not provide an avenue for "look and feel" liti-
gation in Australia. The two problems facing the potential plaintiff
are:
1. The displays and function of the program,
which the plaintiff seeks to protect, form the actual
product itself. Passing off is restricted in its applica-
tion to marks, insignias, devices, get-up and packag-
ing surrounding the product, not the product.
2. Confusion between the plaintiff's program
and the defendant's clone, is extremely unlikely be-
cause of explicit advertising and the astute market
perception.
C. Trade Practices Act, Part V- Unfair Practices as a Form
of "Look and Feel" Protection
The final area, trade practices law, may provide assistance to
potential "look and feel" plaintiffs.297 In 1974, the Trade Practices
294. See, eg., Computerworld Australia, Apr. 8, 1988 at 3, 8, 20, 21; Apr. 15, 1988 at 8;
Pacific Computer Weekly, Apr. 29, 1988 at 39; Computing Australia, Apr. 1, 1988 at 1, 3.
295. See supra note 126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the advertising in the
DCA case.
296. Ewing v. Buttercup Margarine Co. Ltd., 34 R.P.C. 232, 238 (1917); Ouvah Ceylon
Estates Ltd. v. Uva Ceylon Rubbers Estates Ltd., 27 R.P.C. 645, 648 (1910); Society of Mo-
tor Mfrs. & Traders Ltd. v. Motor Mfrs. & Traders Mutual Ins. Co. Ltd., 1 Ch. 675, 686
(1925); Brestian v. Try, 1958 R.P.C. 161, 163.
297. Unfair competition would demonstrate another potential litigation avenue if this
tort was recognized in Australia. Unfair competition was argued in a number of U.S. "look
and feel" cases, although the cases were always decided on copyright principles. See, eg.,
Midway Mfg. v. Artic Int'l, 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.
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Act 1974 (Cth.) was introduced. The Act protects consumers.298
Part V contains the sections aimed at protecting consumers from
unscrupulous and unethical trade practices.
Part V Division 1 contains the. relevant sections of the Act.
Sections 52 and 53 are examined separately below.
1. Section 52
This section provides consumer protection as follows:
52. (1) A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, en-
gage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to
mislead or deceive.
Although originally intended to assist consumers, 299 anyone in-
cluding a competitor may seek redress under section 52 .3 o Traders
frequently use this section and "look and feel" plaintiffs could use it
also.
a. "Misleading" and "'Deceptive" Conduct
The section has been framed widely, lacking any definition for
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental,
653 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F.
Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp.,
659 F. Supp. 449, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Manufacturers Technologies
v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989). While it has been suggested that Australia
would do well to have such a tort, no such animal exists outside of the Trade Practices Act.
See Hexagon Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Broadcasting Comm'n, 7 A.L.R. 233, 251 (1975).
In the case of Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd., 56 A.L.R. 193, 214
(1984), a unanimous High court concluded,
Neither legal principle nor social utility requires or warrants the oblitera-
tion of [the boundary between legal restraint and free competition] by the im-
portation of a cause of action whose main characteristic is the scope it allows,
under high-sounding generalizations, for judicial indulgence of idiosyncratic
notions of what is fair in the market place.
298. The Act also controls and regulates restrictive trade practices, such as anti-competi-
tive agreements, monopolies, and resale price maintenance. This regulatory function is use-
less to a "look and feel" litigant, and will not be examined here. See generally G.Q.
TAPERELL, R.B. VERMEESCH, DJ. HARTLAND, TRADE PRAcTcEs AND CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION (3d ed. 1983); HEALEY, GUIDEBOOK TO AUSTRALIAN TRADE PRACTcES LAW
(4th ed. CCH Austl. 1986).
299. See The First Annual Report of the Trade Practices Commission 1975, para.
1.4.(ii),
The purpose of the Act is, inter alia, to strengthen the position of consum-
ers relative to producers and distributors, to the benefit of the consumers (and
ethical traders), to the benefit also of the competitive process, because produ-
cers and distributors will be activated to compete more on the fundamentals of
price and quality.
300. Hornsby Bldg. Information Centre Pty. Ltd. v. Sydney Bldg. Information Centre
Pty. Ltd., 140 C.L.R. 216 (1978).
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"deceptive" or "misleading" conduct. This gives the provision flex-
ibility, but consequently makes it ambiguous. The Parkdale case
explains that no distinction exists between the two terms and that
both mean "to lead into error. '30 1
Section 52 also protects consumers from conduct which is
"likely" to deceive or mislead. "Likely" in this context means con-
duct which has the "capacity" to mislead, or "may be expected" to
mislead.30 2 This makes it unnecessary to prove actual deception.30 3
However, unlike passing off,30 the conduct must be more than just
confusing.3 5 The conduct must convey enough confusion suffi-
ciently to mislead the consumer.30 6 Invoking the use of this section
will be factually determined by the degree of misrepresentation.30 7
b. Establishing Conduct that Falls Under Section
52
In the Taco Co. v. Taco Bell,3 8 the court provided guidance for
determining whether conduct fell within the ambit of section 52.
The guidelines were to:
1. Identify the relevant section of the public by asking who
will be misled or deceived by this conduct. 3°9
2. Encompass all types of individuals in this relevant sec-
tion by including: the astute and gullible, the intelligent and ig-
norant, the well and poorly educated, and men and women of all
ages pursuing various vocations. 310
3. Determine whether the conduct was likely to, or actu-
ally did mislead or deceive. 1 1
301. Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty. Ltd. v. Puxu Pty. Ltd., 42 A.L.R. 1 (1982).
302. MeWilliams Wines Pty. Ltd. v. McDonald's Sys. ofAustl. Pty. Ltd., 33 A.L.R. 394
(1980).
303. Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty. Ltd. v. Puxu Pty. Ltd., 42 A.L.R. 1 (1982).
304. See infra pp. 151-52, Conduct of Defendant.
305. McWilliams Wines Pty. Ltd. v. McDonald's Sys. ofAusti. Pty. Ltd., 33 A.L.R. 394
(1980); Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty. Ltd. v. Puxu Pty. Ltd. 42 A.L.R. 1 (1982).
306. Taco Co. of Austl. Ltd. v. Taco Bell Pty. Ltd., 42 A.L.R. 177 (1982).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See Weitmann v. Katies Ltd., 29 F.L.R. 336, 343 (1977); Brock v. Terrace Times
Pty. Ltd., 40 A.L.R. 97 (1982).
310. See Puxu Pty. Ltd. v. Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty. Ltd., 43 F.L.R. 405,
424 (1980); World Series Cricket Pty. Ltd. v. Parish, 16 A.L.R. 181, 203 (1977).
311. This is an objective test. Evidence that someone was in fact misled or deceived is
admissible and persuasive but not essential. Annand & Thompson Pty. Ltd. v. T.P.C., 25
A.L.R. 91 (1979); Sterling v. T.P.C., 35 A.L.R. 59 (1981); Snoid v. Handley, 38 A.L.R. 383
(1981); Brock v. Terrace Times, 40 A.L.R. 97 (1982).
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4. Ask why the misconception has arisen.3 12
With the exception of the "audience" test embodied in the first
two guidelines, these guidelines relate only to the interpretation of
specific facts. This section shall therefore examine the interpreta-
tion of the standard "look and feel" cases, and then discuss the au-
dience test separately.
Where a market leader sues a small "clone" producer, the
question arises: Has the clone producer induced the market to buy
the product through deceptive conduct? This conduct obviously in-
volves the advertising, but probably also includes the actual crea-
tion of the clone. Usually, the clone producer will seek to
distinguish the clone from the market leader, if only on the basis of
price.313 Thus, in the standard situation, the advertising would
probably not contravene section 52.
Does the actual production of this non-iterative copy contra-
vene the section? It will not. Provided the maker identifies the
product as coming from them, then they can never contravene sec-
tion 52, no matter how closely the defendant's product mimics the
plaintiff's product. Parkdale Custom Built Furniture v. Puxu dem-
onstrates this point. In that case the items in issue were nearly iden-
tical chairs.314 The defendant sold its chairs with clearly identifying
labels, so the High Court held there was no misleading or deceptive
conduct.31 5 Since clone producers invariably place their name on
their product, "look and feel" will not fall within section 52.
c. Audience
Like passing off, courts in section 52 proceedings will examine
the type of audience or market allegedly deceived or likely to be
deceived.3 1 6  Taco Bell mentions the gullible and less intelligent
member of the specified section in the community. However, Taco
Bell relied on the earlier decision of Parkdale v. Puxu, which ex-
amined the effect of the conduct on the reasonable class member.
As Gibbs J. (as he then was) said, "The heavy burdens which the
section creates cannot have been intended to be imposed for the
benefit of persons who fail to take reasonable care of their own
312. Hornsby Bldg. Information Centre Pty. Ltd. v. Sydney Bldg. Information Centre
Pty. Ltd., 140 C.L.R. 216, 228 (1978).
313. See supra p. 124, the Mirror campaign; Digital Communications Assocs. v. Soft-
klone, supra note 118.
314. Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty. Ltd. v. Puxu Pty. Ltd., 42 A.L.R. 1 (1982).
315. Id.; see also Starcross Pty. Ltd. v. Liquidchlor Pty. Ltd., 39 A.L.R. 644 (1981);
Brock v. Terrace Times, 40 A.L.R. 97 (1982).
316. See supra pp. 143-46, Passing Off as a Form of "Look and Feel" Protection.
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interests." 3 7
As in passing off's audience test, the reasonable person would
not think the plaintiff produced the clone, nor would they doubt
which program they were using.318
d. Conclusion
Section 52 would not help a potential plaintiff in the standard
"look and feel" case. Since the defendant identifies its program as
emanating from the plaintiff's, no deception arises. This is because:
1. The defendant's identification of their program
clearly defeats any alleged misleading conduct.
2. The reasonable person in the computer commu-
nity would not be deceived, because of the identification,
advertising, media exposure and price difference.
3. Even if the user were confused about the origin
of the program, this type of confusion is not actionable
under section 52.
2. Section 53
Section 53 provides in pertinent part as follows:
53. A Corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, in con-
nection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services or
in connection with the promotion by any means of the supply or
use of goods or services .... 319
(c) represent that goods or services have sponsorship, ap-
proval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits
they do not have;
(d) represent that the corporation has sponsorship, ap-
proval or affiliation it does not have.
Unlike the wide provisions of section 52, section 53 enumerates
specific conduct which violates this section. Also unlike section 52,
breach of the provision constitutes a criminal offense.320
a False Representations of Sponsorship or Approval
The scope of false representations encompasses virtually any
317. Parkdale, 42 A.L.R. 1, (1982); see also Taco Co. of Austl. Ltd. v. Taco Bell Pty.
Ltd., 42 A.L.R. 177 (1982); Annand & Thompson v. T.P.C., 40 F.L.R. 165, 188-89 (1979);
United Telecasters Sydney Pty. Ltd. v. Pan Hotels Int'l Pty. Ltd., [1978] 3 T.P.R. 220.
318. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
319. Since no issue exists that "look and feel" defendants are corporations involved in
commerce, it will not be discussed further.
320. Trade Practices Act, § 79.
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potential form of advertising or promotion. False representations
mean a direct statement, affirmation, or denial, and also includes
pictures and in some cases conduct. Odometer readings on a used
car,3 2 1 goods for sale with clearly visible statements, 322 and televi-
sion advertisements describe representations within the meaning of
this section.3 23 Therefore under this section, any form of advertis-
ing or promotion by the "look and feel" plaintiff will amount to a
representation.
There need not be a specific "representee." If defendant made
the false representation, it is sufficient to offend the Act.324
Section 53(c) prohibits representations of sponsorship or ap-
proval, inter alia, of goods or services which they do not have. Sec-
tion 53(d) prohibits similar representations of sponsorship or
approval of the corporation.
Representations showing mere association are insufficient, a
strong link must be represented.325 Big Mac considered the mean-
ing of "sponsor" and "sponsorship. ' 326 Franki, J. held that sponsor
meant, "One who enters into an engagement, makes a formal prom-
ise or pledge, on behalf of another; a surety."327 The meaning of
"approval" was also examined in that case as being "to sanction, to
pronounce to be good; commend., 3
28
Does then the advertisement of a "clone" as identical to an-
other program falsely represent an agreement between the corpora-
tions or programs, or represent a sanctioning of the program or
"clone" making corporation? It does not. The corporations are
clearly in competition, since the clone drastically undersells the
original. Moreover, unless the clone corporation makes no claims
of sanctioning by the market leader, there will be no false represen-
tation of approval. Since the price difference entails the thrust of
the advertising, no sanctioning could be inferred.
321. Given v. C.V. Holland (Holdings) Pty. Ltd., 15 A.L.R. 439 (1977); Finger v.
Malua Motors Pty. Ltd., A.T.P.R. 1140-061 (1978).
322. Weitmann v. Katies Ltd. & Ors, 29 F.L.R. 336 (1977).
323. Guthrie v. Universal Telecasters Queensl. Ltd., 18 A.L.R. 531 (1977).
324. Thompson v. Rile McKay, 29 A.L.R. 657 (1980).
325. McDonald's Sys. of Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. McWilliam's Wines Pty. Ltd., 28 A.L.R
236, 247-48 (1979).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 247. The decision of Justice Franki was overturned on appeal, but only on his
ruling on section 52. His Honour's decision on section 53 was affirmed by the Full Federal
Court. McWilliam's Wines Pty. Ltd. v. McDonald's Sys. of Austl. Pty. Ltd., 33 A.L.R. 394
(1980).
328. McDonald's Sys. ofAustl. Pty. Ltd. v McWilliam's Wines Pty. Ltd., 28 A.L.R. 236,
248 (1979).
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b. Conclusion
Section 53 will be of no assistance to a "look and feel" litigant,
unless the defendant foolishly claims a sanction or agreement be-
tween the two companies. This is unlikely to ever happen.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. The American Law
The preceding discussion illustrates that "look and feel" pro-
tection is not nearly as novel as it first appears. Two distinct
streams fundamentally divide "look and feel" cases: the literary
work stream and the audiovisual work stream.
1. The Literary Work Stream
The apogee of current decisions protects the structure, se-
quence and organization of literary work stream cases. Even
though Whelan v. Jaslow3 2 9 and Plains Cotton v. Goodpasture330 re-
main irreconcilable, the author favors Whelan's approach because it
categorically protected structure, and held that substantial similar-
ity of overall structure sequence, and organization constituted in-
fringement. Additionally, subsequent cases support the contention
that copyright protects structure.131
This begs the question: Should we, in principle, protect the
structure of computer programs? The reasoning of Meredith Corp.
v. Harper & Row Publishers332 provides the best answer. Meredith
held that the structure of a book amounted to protectable expres-
sion. There has been no hue and cry over Meredith, giving the clear
indication that copyright protects book structure. Therefore, com-
puter program structure should not be denied equal protection
merely because it is a new field of copyright.
2. The Audiovisual Work Stream
The second stream is the audiovisual work stream. It repre-
sents the true "look and feel" stream. In the author's opinion, the
literary stream and the audiovisual stream should remain distinct,
329. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa.
1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
330. Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256
(5th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 813 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
331. See supra pp. 107-08, Whelan v. Jaslow, pp. 108-09, Plains Cotton v. Goodpasture,
and p. 109, Pearl Systems v. Competition Electronics.
332. 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974), opinion after
trial, 413 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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because they deal with two different categories of copyright works.
Each stream works more coherently without the introduction of
each other's analytical elements because it confuses the issues. The
case of Broderbund,333 to name the most obvious, stands as warning
of the danger the courts face if they attempt to join these streams.
The "look and feel" stream, or audiovisual work stream, actu-
ally does not concern both the "look" and "feel" of a program. It
concerns only the program's "look." It is in fact just traditional
audiovisual copyright, dealing with the appearance of the work.
The "feel" or functioning of the program is not examined, nor war-
rants it. If the actual elements in the display or the sequence of
displays are sufficiently removed from a computer interface's under-
lying idea, then they deserve and are protected by the audiovisual
copyright.
Unfortunately, the audiovisual stream is itself divided. This
stream examines copyright in two distinct elements: the display
screens and the sequence of presentation of the display screens. The
first element, the screen itself, falls within the traditional bounds of
audiovisual copyright. Protecting the sequence of those screens
represents a new application of copyright.
a. Traditional Audiovisual Copyright
Two cases have decided copyright issues on the basis of tradi-
tional audiovisual copyright.334 The pending Apple case is likely to
follow their lead.335 The courts have created nothing controversial
in applying traditional audiovisual copyright to computer displays.
There is no distinction between these cases and the cases which
dealt with copyright in video games.3 3 6
The courts have restricted "look and feel" copyright, by deal-
ing only with the visual appearance of the screen. This has the ad-
vantage of keeping copyright within its traditional bounds. The
judges may then rely on the wealth of experience and precedent in
the field. The restriction does not disadvantage a plaintiff who has
placed sufficient work into the computer displays to merit copyright
protection. Therefore, manufacturers obtain adequate protection.
This limit on "look and feel" copyright thus balances the competing
333. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D.
Cal. 1986).
334. Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp 449, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
335. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
336. See supra pp. 111-15, The Audiovisual Work Stream.
1991]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
policies that protect intellectual effort and avoid monopoly of
markets.
b. The New Application: Sequence
However, a new field of copyright protection has emerged: the
sequence of computer displays. Courts in four cases,
Broderbund,337 MTI,338 Johnson,339 and Lotus,34° have determined
that this sequence warrants copyright protection. This means that
copyright protection for computers contains two new elements: the
"structure, sequence and organization" of the code and the se-
quence of the displays. One court341 called both elements "non-
literal expression."
Again the question arises: should sequence be protected? If
one accepts Meredith's principle that structure equals expression
and deserves protection, then it is hard to answer no to this ques-
tion. The same principle applies to book structure, program struc-
ture and display screen structure. The latter element, display screen
structure, is simply the sequence of displays presented to the user.
Provided one can properly characterize a particular plaintiff's se-
quence as expression then no reason exists why sequence should not
be protected.
B. The Australian Law
In Australia, passing off, unfair competition, and unfair trade
practices clearly will not avail a potential "look and feel" plaintiff in
the standard "look and feel" case. Copyright remains the most ap-
propriate form of action, just as in the United States. However,
Australian courts are more tied to precedent than their American
counterparts. This may mean that "artistic work" copyright, the
Australian equivalent to "audiovisual work" copyright, will not as-
sist the plaintiff in a "look and feel" case. Unless the judges allow
computer generated images on a screen to constitute a painting or
drawing, the plaintiff will fail.342
337. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D.
Cal. 1986).
338. Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D. Conn.
1989).
339. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir.
1989).
340. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 68 (D. Mass. 1990).
341. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989).
342. Whether the Australian Federal Parliament will legislate in favor of "look and feel"
is a matter purely for conjecture.
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The United States and Australia apply similar standard copy-
right concepts. Therefore, given the above proviso, the "look and
feel" of a program deserves protection. Australian courts are famil-
iar with policy arguments to grant rights to copyright plaintiffs al-
lowing the attendant diminution of the rights of others to copy
these innovations. Indeed, this balancing act is as old as copyright
itself. Thus, no policy reason exists why Australian judges should
not follow their Trans-Atlantic brethren.
Whether Australian courts will go this far is unlikely. The
spectre of granting overwhelming monopolies, which held sway in
Synercom v. University Computing,343 will probably frighten the
technically unsure judiciary into denying protection. This would be
a pity, since this article demonstrates there is nothing unusual about
the field.
343. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computer Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D.
Tex. 1978).
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